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ENFORCEMENT OF JAPANESE SECURITIES LEGISLATION
MISAO TATSUTA *
1. Introduction
As in most advanced countries, protection of investors is one of the major
national goals in Japan. To achieve this protection, the Securities and Exchange
Law 1 was enacted in 1948. The Law assumes that it will be enforced by various
bodies: by the government through its licensing, reviewing and monitoring power;
by the courts through injunction and civil and criminal decrees; by self-regulatory
organizations such as stock exchanges and the securities dealers association; and by
private persons through damage suits against those who have violated the law.
This basic structure, so far as the statutory scheme is concerned, appears much
the same as its United States counterpart, after which the statute was modeled. The
only difference is the fortunate absence of federalism in Japan. When it comes to
actual practice, however, the picture differs considerably on the Japanese side of
the Pacific Ocean from the U.S. side.
In this paper, the writer tries to sketch how the Japanese Securities and Ex-
change Law is actually enforced. Section 2 describes briefly the sources of law upon
which the enforcement is based and the organization of various regulatory bodies.
Sections 3 and 4 give a picture of how the enforcement mechanisms operate to pre-
vent securities fraud in some selected areas of great importance: the issuing process
and disclosure problems in Section 3, and the secondary market in Section 4. Some
cases of securities fraud are described in Section 5 for the purpose of showing how
the law has responded after the fact.
Limited space prevents the discussion in this paper of the Securities Investment
Trust Law 2 and the Law on Foreign Securities Firms. 3 Although each of these
statutes has special features of its own, one may infer their general modes of opera-
tion from what is described here about the Securities and Exchange Law.
* Mr. Tatsuta is a member of the Faculty of Law of Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan.
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2. The regulatory mechanism and its legal basis
A. Statutory framework
(1) Law and rules
While the Securities and Exchange Law contains more than two hundred articles,
many of them are not self-executing, but effective only when implemented by
cabinet rules (seirei) and/or ministerial rules (sh~rei). Cabinet rules, which provide
rules in areas delegated by the statute, must be passed by the cabinet, signed by the
minister concerned and the prime minister as well, and promulgated by the
Emperor. 4 Ministerial rules are signed and promulgated by the minister concerned
(the Finance Minister in the case of the Securities and Exchange Law) to provide
rules in areas delegated by the statute or by cabinet rules. s
For example, the Securities and Exchange Law simply prohibits stabilizing trans-
actions in contravention of a cabinet rule. 6 In turn, the cabinet rule sets forth
detailed provisions concerning permissible stabilization transactions, ' and a minis-
terial rule provides filing and reporting requirements with respect to a stabilization
transaction. z
(2) Releases
Like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Director of the
Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance has issued numerous releases (tsitiatsu)
with regard to the construction of the Securities and Exchange Law and the rules
issued thereunder. Approximately ten have been issued each year. Many of the
releases are addressed to the directors of the regional financial bureaus (see B(2),
infra), and give instructions for handling a particular matter. Others are addressed
either to the presidents of the stock exchanges, to the chairman of the Securities
Dealers Association of Japan or to the chairman of the Japanese Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants (JICPA). Only rarely are releases addressed to specific
securities firms, but when a release is addressed to the directors of the regional
bureaus, it sometimes is circulated among securities firms, or the Ministry finds an
opportunity to explain the import of the release to the securities firms.
In addition, an exchange of correspondence (jimurenraku) between the chlief of
a certain division in the Securities Bureau and regional officers in charge of the
matter specified in the correspondence may be publicly released. Of course, this
correspondence relates to matters of less importance than those covered by releases.
Releases and business correspondence do not constitute direct sources of law. In
practice, however, securities administration is carried out in accordance with them,
and it is important to know their contents. While most of them are published and
easily available, some of them are kept confidential.
B. Governmental bodies for securities regulation
(1) Statutory provisions
The Securities and Exchange Law provides for its enforcement by the Finance
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Minister (5kradaiin). Registration statements, annual, semi-annual and current
reports, and tender offer statements must be filed with the Finance Minister. He has
power to review them and to issue orders requiring amendments or stop orders if
necessary. 9 He also has power to grant and revoke licenses to securities firms, stock
exchanges and securities finance companies, as well as to control their business
operations. 10 A securities dealers association must be registered with the Finance
Minister;" so must account executives (registered representatives) of securities
firms. 12 The Minister supervises the JICPA, and has power to take direct disciplin-
ary action against certified public accountants who have violated the law; he may,
for example, revoke their registration with the JICPA. 13
The Finance Minister is authorized, if necessary in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to inspect issuers, securities firms, securities dealers associa-
tions, stock exchanges, securities finance companies and certified public accoun-
tants, as well as customers and other related persons. 14
The Finance Minister may apply to the court for an injunction in urgent
cases. 15 Such an application has as yet never been made, but the Minister has made
active use of other powers. He has the duty to notify the public prosecutor's
office if he suspects that the criminal law has been violated with regard to a securi-
ties transaction. 16 On the other hand, he is not empowered to bring a civil suit on
behalf of a private party as ancillary relief.
(2) Securities bureau
The Finance Minister is in charge not only of securities administration but also
of other financial matters, such as the national budget, taxation, banking and
insurance. Within the Ministry of Finance (5kurashN), securities administration is
assigned to the Securities Bureau (shkenkyoku). 17 At present, the Bureau consists
of six divisions, 18 with 133 staff members. In addition, a considerable number of
staff members are employed in securities administration in ten regional financial
bureaus (zainukyoku).
As of the end of 1976, 2,774 corporations filed registration statements and/or
annual, semi-annual and current reports with the Finance Minister; 1,135 corpora-
tions filed them with the headquarters of the Ministry of Finance, i.e., the Securi-
ties Bureau, and the rest filed them with the regional financial bureaus. 19 All
amendment or stop orders are issued by the Bureau, regardless of where the regis-
tration statement or report was filed. As of the same date, there existed 259
domestic licensed securities firms, but the Bureau itself supervises only 28 of the
more important firms (including the Big Four), *0 leaving most of the supervision
of the other securities firms to the regional financial bureaus. 21
Since the Securities Bureau is one of the seven bureaus within the Ministry of
Finance, it is easy to coordinate securities policy with other financial policies.
Senior members of the staff have experience in various bureaus in the Ministry. This
may have both merits and demerits. Policies of critical importance, developed
through the coordination of various considerations in the financial area, are gener-
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ally accepted within the Ministry and can be readily implemented, as we shall see
below in reference to remedial measures taken to cope with the fear of an industry-
wide crash in the mid-1960s. 2 On the other hand, such coordination may make it
difficult to form a genuine investor-protection policy when it would affect other
industries, and may sometimes deter quick responses; examples will be seen below
in reference both to the restriction on new issues of securities and to the unsatis-
factory enforcement of the rules against insider trading. 23 Rotation of promising
members of the staff at short intervals keeps the Securities Bureau from becoming
the industry's captive, and helps the development of securities policies and the mak-
ing of decisions from a broad perspective, but the short stay of staff members may
serve to restrict expertise and continuity in securities administration. 24 On the
whole, thus far, the merits of the system have outweighed its demerits because of
the staffs high competence and industriousness.
(3) Auxiliary boards
The Securities and Exchange Council (shkentorihiki shingikai) is one of the
organizations attached to the Ministry of Finance. Its purpose is to study and con-
sider important problems with regard to securities transactions, 2s and it consists
of 13 part-time members appointed by the Finance Minister for a two-year term. 26
At times the Council sets up a temporary subcommittee, recruiting experts from
the outside to study and consider a specific problem.
Since its birth in 1952, the Securities and Exchange Council has made a number
of studies and recommendations which have produced amendments to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Law and the rules thereunder, have affected the rules and regula-
tions of self-regulatory bodies, and have been reflected in the enforcement practices
of the Securities Bureau. Some of the Council's opinions relate to areas, such as the
tax system, which are outside the securities regulation system but have significant
impact upon it.
The Securities Bureau serves as a secretariat for the Securities and Exchange
Council. 21 The Bureau staff makes basic investigations, collects statistics and pre-
pares drafts of the Council's opinions.
In the accounting area, the Financial Accounting Council (Kigyakaikel shingikai)
plays an important role. This council is composed of not more than 40 members,
also part-time, appointed by the Finance Minister for a two-year term. 28
The Financial Accounting Council and its predecessor have,since 1947, formulated
several sets of accounting principles and standards, such as the Financial Account-
ing Principles and the Consolidated Financial Statements Principles, both of which
have been embodied almost verbatim in statutory rules. 29 These principles, and the
annexed official comments by the Council, have given direction to accounting
practice in postwar Japan. The Council has also issued a series of opinions appealing
for coordination of the Financial Accounting Principles with the Commercial Code
and tax statutes, many of which have resulted in amendments to those statutes.
The Securities Bureau serves as a secretariat for the Financial Accounting Coun-
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eil as well. " Here, accounting professors, rather than the Bureau staff, seem to
have been most influential in the Council's work.
Another body that is attached to the Ministry of Finance is the Certified Public
Accountants Inquiry Council (Kninkaikeishi shinsakai), composed of ten part-
time members appointed by the Finance Minister for a two-year term. 31 This
Council investigates and considers important problems with respect to the certi-
fied public accountant system. It takes disciplinary action against CPAs and
administers CPA examinations. 32
C. Self-regulatory organizations
(1) Stock exchanges
There are now eight stock exchanges in Japan, of which the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change is by far the most significant. 3 It is true that, as will be seen below, stock
exchanges are self-regulatory bodies with power over issuers and members, but the
degree of self-regulation is quite different from that of their British counterpart.
The Finance Minister holds the power of life and death over Japanese stock ex-
changes.
The existence of a stock exchange is dependent upon a license granted by the
Finance Minister, who reviews each application in light of the exchange's rules,
organization and location. 3 The Minister's approval is necessary for a stock ex-
change to amend its constitution or other rules, and to list or delist a stock. .s The
Minister may order an exchange to amend its constitution or other rules, to list or
delist a specified stock, or to dismiss an officer. 36 If a stock exchange violates the
statute, rules or administrative orders, or fails to enforce its rules vis-a-vis a member
firm or issuer that has violated the Securities and Exchange Law, an administra-
tive order or the exchange's rules, the Finance Minister has the power to revoke the
exchange's license, suspend its operations or order it to dismiss one or more of its
officers."
No case has -been reported thus far where the Finance Minister has taken
enforcement action against a stock exchange by making use of the powers enumer-
ated above. This does not mean, however, that stock exchanges have always per-
formed their mission perfectly. The Securities and Exchange Council, in its 1967
report, pointed out that the operation of stock exchanges had not always been
carried out in the public interest and for the protection of investors, and urged that
the number of non-member directors be increased and the power of the president
be enlarged. 38 The stock exchanges have effected reforms along these lines. 
Recently, major stock exchanges have persuaded public figures with experience
in securities administration to become their presidents. 40 With such strong leader-
ship, stock exchanges have succeeded in increasing their authority over issuers and
member firms. At the same time, the Securities Bureau staff has placed more trust
in the stock exchanges, and has been able to dispense with issuing as many detailed
instructions and guides.
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The eight stock exchanges have acted in concert. For instance, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange first amends its constitution or rules, obtaining approval from the
Finance Minister for the change. The Osaka Stock Exchange does the same after
one or two days, and then the other exchanges follow suit. In this way, the con-
stitutions and rules of the eight stock exchanges are almost identical.
(2) Securities Dealers Association
At present, all of the 259 securities firms throughout Japan are members of a
single association: the Securities Dealers Association of Japan (Nippon Shken-
gykai). 41 There is thus no need for rules, such as the SECO rules in the U.S., to
regulate securities firms that are not members of a self-regulatory organization.
The Finance Minister's supervisory power over a securities dealers association is
similar to his power over a stock exchange, except that a securities dealers associa-
tion is not licensed by, but is registered with, the Finance Minister. 42
The Securities Dealers Association of Japan has its Constitution, Rules of Fair
Practice, Uniform Practice Code and other rules and resolutions of its board of
directors, all of which bind its member firms. The Association requires its member
firms to have their account executives (registered representatives) take its qualifica-
tion test prior to their registration with the Finance Minister. " Because of the
limited scale of the over-the-counter market in Japan, the role of the Association
is less important than that of the U.S. National Association of Securities Dealers. '4
Aside from self-regulation by the Association, it has become a common practice
for major 'universal' securities firms or companies to agree to formulate autono-
mous rules (ishu rules) governing various aspects of their business conduct. 4s We
may easily imagine that the Securities Bureau has had some part in formulatingsuch
rules, in spite of its public denial.
(3) Institute ofAccountants
The history of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA-
Nippon Kaninkaikeishi-ky~kai) dates back to 1953 when it was formed as a volun-
tary nonprofit corporation pursuant to the Civil Code. By 1965, nearly 80% of
Japan's CPAs were members. In that year, the Certified Public Accountants
Inquiry Council recommended that the law be amended to reorganize the JICPA.
Immediately after the 1966 amendment of the Certified Public Accountants
Law along the lines of this recommendation, the new JICPA was founded as
a self-regulatory organization with compulsory membership of all CPAs. 4 6
The JICPA is required to set up a Qualification Inquiry Committee (shikaku-
shinsakai) to inquire into the qualifications of a CPA whom the Institute proposes
to refuse to register. T he Committee consists of five members appointed by the
Chairman of the Institute and approved by the Finance Minister. Among the five
must be included the Chairman himself and a member of the Ministry of Finance
staff. 48
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The Finance Minister has power to set aside a resolution of a general meeting
of the Institute which is against the law, the rules of the Institute or the public
interest, and to order removal of any officer who has violated the law or the rules of
the Institute, or who has acted against the public interest. 9
3. Regulation of new issues and disclosure
A. Selection of issuers
The Securities and Exchange Law, like the U.S. model, is based upon a philoso-
phy of disclosure. An issuer may sell its securities in a public offering, no matter
how bad its financial condition may be, so long as it meets the disclosure require-
ments. It is the investors who must decide whether or not to buy the securities,
basing their judgments on the disclosed information. This is the law on its face,
but in reality an inferior issuer is not permitted to market its securities, and even a
blue chip issuer cannot market its securities at will when money is tight. This is
true not only because stock exchanges set up substantive criteria for listing and
underwriters are reluctant to handle unsaleable securities, but also because new
issues are 'adjusted' taking into account a number of considerations. Moreover, the
'adjustment' seems to be colored with a quasi-public interest, so to speak. Let us see
briefly who makes such 'adjustments' and how they are made.
[1) Capital stock
When an issuer wishes to increase its capital by issuing new shares, either through
a public offering or a private placement, it has to complete the 'application form for'
issuing new shares' (shinkabushiki-hakk5 mrshikomisho) and file it with the
managing underwriter five months before the proposed issue date. The application
is reviewed by a conference consisting of the executive vice-presidents of each of
the Big Four (actually in many cases the conference is attended by the heads of their
underwriting departments) on behalf of the Conference Concerning Coordination
of Capital Increase (Z~shi no ch~sei ni kansuru kondankai), which reflects the
interests of the government and various industries. so A by-law of the Conference
provides criteria for issuing new shares through a rights offering, ranging from the
price at which the new stock may be issued to the net profit that the issuer must be
earning, with limited exceptions for some industries. 5' The Securities Bureau, in its
1969 release about underwriting, urges underwriters to abide strictly by this by-
law. 52
The practice of raising capital by issuing new shares at the current market price
(with a discount of approximately 8%) has become more and more popular since
the late 1960s, and has replaced the previous practice of rights offerings at par. As
a result, underwriters have set up autonomous rules which provide that they will
refrain from underwriting new shares of issuers which fail to meet the criteria stipu-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1978
M. Tatsuta /Enforcement of Japanese securities legislation
lated in the rules with respect to dividends, earnings and free distribution of shares. 53
The Securities Bureau has repeatedly taken the position that underwriters should
exercise due diligence to assure that their assistance in marketing is given only to
issues of good quality. s" Because of the lack of litigation by investors, under-
writers have tended to neglect their responsibilities in spite of their strict statutory
liability. " In response to the warnings by the Securities Bureau, underwriters,
represented by the Big Four, entered into an agreement with the JICPA with
respect to the issuing of comfort letters. 56 Nowadays, managing underwriters
dutifully request answers by the issuer to their questionnaires and secure the docu-
ments necessary to review the issue, including a comfort letter from the auditing
CPA. However, due diligence reviews are not inspired by the fear of damage suits
and must be continually encouraged through administrative guidance. 57
The selection of issuers, both quantitative and qualitative, through coordination
based upon autonomous rules of the securities industry, is designed not merely for
investor protection but also to achieve broader financial policies, such as inducing
capital to flow into the industries that are deemed most desirable from the view-
point of the national economy. Moreover, the autonomous rules seem to be built
into the enforcement policy of the government. '8 To this extent, the laissez-faire
principle in the capital market has been modified.
(2) Debt securities
Issues of corporate bonds and debentures are also coordinated in a manner
similar to that just described about new stock issues. Here the so-called Flotation
Conference (Kisaikai) appears on stage, composed of representatives of the Big
Four and the major trustee banks. Several levels of its subordinate bodies filter
applications for bond issues before they reach coordination by the Conference.
Usually coordination is carried out taking issuers' needs into consideration, but oil
some occasions when money was very tight, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Japan have rendered assistance in coordinating applications for debt issues. At any
rate, a corporation with less than four billion yen of net assets is not qualified to
apply. 5 9 Once selected, the terms of issue of the debt securities of a particular
corporation are determined almost automatically according to the rating criteria
laid down by the Conference.
It goes without saying that the terms of issue of corporate debentures are closely
linked with the level of interest rates. The Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan,
and the Federation of Economic Organizations are among the bodies that may
influence the terms of issue. The Bond Underwriters Association (K~shasai Hikiu-
keky~kai), a membership organization of 62 underwriting firms, has made a general
survey of the procedures used in fixing the terms of issue of debt securities. This
Association and the Flotation Conference have taken steps to improve the methods
of determining the ratings of particular issues, and to increase the permissible varia-
tions in issue terms once an issue has been given a rating. 60
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B. Securing Adequate Disclosure
(1) Review of filed statements
The following are required to be filed with the Finance Minister: registration
statements (yfikash6ken todokeidesho), periodic reports (ylkashdken hkokusho),
semi-annual reports (hanki hakokusho) and current reports (rinji h~kokusho). 61
Except for current reports, these statements and reports must contain financial
statements that have been audited by independent certified public accountants. 62
The Finance Minister reviews these statements and reports, and if he finds a
false statement or an omission of a material fact, he may order the issuer to file
an amendment. 63 He is also empowered to issue a stop order with respect to a
registration statement." When an issuer files an amendment to one of its periodic
reports, it must promptly announce the fact in a daily newspaper. 6s In addition, if
the Finance Minister finds a material misstatement in a registration statement or
a periodic report, he has power, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to
issue a stop order or extend the waiting period, even for subsequent public offer-
ings by the same issuer that are filed within one year after the filing of the untrue
statement or report. 66
Prior to 1965, the staff of the Securities Bureau made a preliminary review of
a registration statement before it was formally filed, in order to eliminate the
necessity of amendments to correct inadvertent errors committed by inexperienced
applicants. Even today, some issuers consult with the Bureau staff with respect to
the calendar of prospective financings. The number of such consultations, however,
has diminished considerably as issuers and underwriters have become accustomed to
the preparation of registration statements. The same is true with periodic reports.
The staff of the Securities Bureau reviews the statements and reports that are
filed with it, paying attention to whether relevant facts are adequately disclosed.
When questions arise, the Bureau asks the issuer, the CPA or the managing under-
writer for explanations. Where deemed necessary for review, the Bureau asks the
issuer or the CPA to furnish related documents, such as the tax return. On occa-
sion, when considered necessary to ascertain the adequacy of the statement, the
Bureau carries out inspections pursuant to Article 26 of the Securities and
Exchange Law.
Upon finding a statement or report that is not properly prepared, the Bureau
usually requests the issuer to file an amendment on the issuer's own initiative.
Upon finding a false statement, the Bureau as a rule orders the issuer to file an
amendment, takes disciplinary action against the CPA and recommends, among
other things, that the CPA decline to audit the same issuer in the future. Where the
falsity is extraordinarily gross, the Bureau notifies the public prosecutor's office,
and if deemed necessary for the protection of investors, it announces, pursuant to
Article 193-2, paragraph 5, of the Securities and Exchange Law, that it will refuse
to accept, in whole or in part, registration statements and periodic and semi-annual
reports containing financial statements audited by the same CPA. Where the Bureau
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finds the managing underwriter's investigation insufficient, the Bureau may take
action to improve the underwriter's method of operations, such as assisting it to
establish a better system for developing the facts about issuers whose securities it
plans to market. 67
A copy of the proxy form (ininh3-ytshi) and the proxy statement (sankslshorui)
must be fied with the regional bureau in whose jurisdiction the solicitor of the
proxy has its domicile, but it suffices to file them simultaneously with the mailing
of the proxy materials to the shareholders, which means they are not subject to
advance review. 68 The Finance Minister has never resorted to the courts to enjoin
the solicitation of proxies or the holding of a shareholders meeting, nor has he ever
given publicity to misstatements in proxy materials. 69 It is also strange to note
that almost all proxy statements used for the election of directors do not show any
financial interest relationship between the candidate and the corporation, and do
not disclose any renumeration paid to him, even though these proxy statements
have been reviewed by the Securities Bureau. '0 It would be fair to say, therefore,
that disclosure by means of proxy materials has not played as important a role in
Japan as in the U.S. "i
(2) Timely disclosures
A current report is the only means by which investors may become aware of
material facts which have taken place subsequent to the last filing of periodic
or semi-annual reports. 2 Nevertheless, the facts required to be stated in current
reports are confined to quite a narrow range, such as the occurrence of a material
calamity that causes damage in the amount of at least 1% of the book value of the
assets. 73
Apart from this, there is no provision in the Securities and Exchange Law or the
rules thereunder, nor in any release, that requires timely disclosures. The Securities
and Exchange Council, while recognizing the importance of timely disclosures and
the likelihood of insider trading if disclosure is delayed, takes the position that no
rule regulating timely disclosures should be promulgated as yet, because the criteria
for materiality of information and timeliness of dissemination are not always cer-
tain. The Council has stated that as experience is accumulated, methods will be
developed to cope with this problem, which indicates the Council will rely heavily
and place great confidence in the self-regulatory practices developed by the stock
exchanges. 74
In 1974, the Tokyo Stock Exchange issued a circular to its listed issuers, request-
ing that they abide by its rules on prompt notice, that material information be
timely disclosed through a nationwide news medium and that, so far as possible,
they notify the Exchange of a prospective disclosure in advance. 75 The Osaka,
Nagoya and other stockexchanges followed suit immediately.
This request was ignored when a listed corporation failed to notify the Tokyo
Stock Exchange promptly of its application for corporate reorganization in Novem-
ber, 1975, resulting in serious disorder in the market. 76 This disaster caused the
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Exchange to press listed corporations through another circular to comply with its
rules, especially the one requiring a prompt and accurate reply to its inquiries, and
to register with it the name of an executive who would serve as spokesman for the
corporation. 7" Since the Exchange was afraid some corporations had mistaken the
purport of these two circulars, it issued a third one in April, 1976, to explain in
detail its policy about timely disclosures. 78 Admirable as the Exchange's efforts
may have been, they amount merely to securing information necessary to its
supervision of floor trading, not to disclosures to investors. Therefore, we cannot
regard this as a timely disclosure policy in the accepted sense. 79
On the other hand, the Japanese stock exchanges have been attempting to secure
more prompt publication of annual financial statements of listed corporations.
Since the 1974 amendments to the Commercial Code, which introduced com-
pulsory CPA audits of annual financial statements before they are presented to the
shareholders meeting for approval, 80 most corporations have not given publicity
to their financial statements until two months after the close of their fiscal year. 81
Issuers justify the delay of a month on the ground that they should not publicize
unaudited figures which may be subject to change. 82 Stock exchanges were upset
by the adverse effect of the 1974 amendments, which had been aimed at enhancing
investor protection. The Tokyo Stock Exchange repeatedly issued circulars to
issuers requesting prompt publication of annual financial statements, and suggested
that pre-audit reviews by and closer contact with the CPA firm during the course
of the fiscal year would help in achieving this goal. 83 In a recent circular, the
JICPA announced its position that an auditor may consent to the issuer's publiciz-
ing its annual financial statement even before the audit has been completed so long
as the unaudited items and figures are not material and there is no exception to be
disclosed. 84
How these requests will affect practice is not known. The Securities and
Exchange Council, though admitting the necessity of publicizing annual financial
statements without delay, seems to be sympathetic to the issuers' practice of
awaiting the completion of the audit. 8' However, the issuer's justification for the
delay referred to above, is unwarranted, for directors may be held liable not because
they have given publicity to unaudited annual financial statements,but because they
have publicized untrue accounts. 86
4. Regulation of securities companies and the secondary market
A. Regulation of securities companies
(1) License system
Securities businesses may be operated only by stock corporations that have been
granted licenses by the Finance Minister. 87 Prior to World War II, broker-dealers,
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who could have been individuals, were also required to have licenises. 88 The
aborted Securities and Exchange Law of 1947 89 did not alter this phase of the law,
but by order of the Occupation forces the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948
adopted a registration system for the first time in the history of broker-dealer
regulation. Nostalgia for the old license system, however, was so strong that the
1965 amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law returned the statute to the
more familiar type of regulation. This occurred at a time when most broker-dealers
were in poor financial condition because of the severe stock market depression of
the mid-1960s, which culminated in the Yamaichi failure and the formation of
Joint Securities. 9 The Securities and Exchange Council took the lead for this
return to the old license system, using the argument that the government, in order
to protect investors in a time of severe stock market uncertainty, should have
greater power over broker-dealers. This argument won over the contention that
tight bureaucratic control would stifle the securities industry. 91
Under the current regulatory system, a securities firm must have at least one
type of license among four specified classes, depending upon the kind of business
it engages in. 92 A minimum amount of stated capital is prescribed for the appli-
cant, which may be from one million yen to three billion yen, according to the type
and location of its business. 93
Both positive and negative criteria must be satisfied before a license is granted.
The former are quite abstract and permit wide discretion on the part of the Finance
Minister. The latter are somewhat more objective. The positive criteria are: (1) the
applicant has sufficient financial resources to carry out its proposed business, and
the prospect for profits is satisfactory; (2) the applicant, in the liglt of its
personnel, has sufficient knowledge and experience to carry out its business fairly
and adequately and has a good reputation; and (3) the proposed securities
business is necessary and appropriate, in the light of the volume of securities trans-
actions, the number of existing securities firms and offices, and other economic
circumstances in the district where the applicant proposes to carry out its
business. 94 Negative criteria are those which disqualify an applicant, such as
having stated capital less than the minimum requirement or having a director or
supervisor disqualified from serving in a securities firm. 9' The term 'necessary
and appropriate' as part of the third positive criterion, if construed literally, would
serve to perpetuate a monopoly or oligopoly by existing securities firms. Hence it
should be narrowly construed, and come into play only in order to prevent
cut-throat competition among securities films. 96
The Finance Minister may grant a license with some qualifications if it is neces-
sary in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 9' For example, an
applicant proposing to operate as a broker and as a dealer may be permitted to
engage in sales of securities on its own account only to the extent necessary to
execute customers' orders. 98 In addition, all of the licenses have the following
qualification:
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The Finance Minister may alter the qualifications attached to this license or attach additional
qualifications to it to the extent necessary in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
According to the Securities Bureau, this reservation was expressed in order to
clarify the Minister's power. 99
(2) Business and financial soundness
Although its phraseology is drawn from that rich reservoir of anti-fraud law, U.S.
SEC Rule lOb-5, Article 58 of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law is simply
inactive. The Securities Bureau pumps up its regulatory authority vis-a-vis securities
firms from several wells, of which two deserve mentioning: Article 50 and Article
54, both being byproducts of the 1965 license revival. 1o
Article 50 prohibits securities firms or their officers and employees from engag-
ing in: (1) solicitation of orders by giving customers an affirmative opinion that the
price of the security will rise or fall; (2) solicitation of orders accompanied by a
promise that the securities firm will compensate for all or a part of any loss the
customer may suffer; and (3) activities in connection with a purchase, sale or other
transaction in securities that are proscribed by a ministerial rule as running counter
to the protection of investors, impairing the fairness of the transaction or injuring
the reputation of the securities industry. Based upon the last empowering clause, a
ministerial rule, the Soundness Rule, proscribes: (1) false or misleading representa-
tions- (2) solicitation of orders with the aid of a promise to offer certain benefits;
(3) effecting a series of transactions which manipulate quotations, giving orders to
other firms or accepting orders that, to the firm's knowledge, may manipulate
quotations; (4) liquidating the firm's position by counter-sale, if its position was
derived from a sale or purchase on its own account against a customer's margin
transaction without delivery of cash or securities; (5) an officer's or employee's sale
or purchase of securities which takes advantage of non-public information obtained
through his position or which is made solely for the purpose of speculation; and (6)
certain types of transactions in connection with a stabilization. 101
Upon finding a violation of these provisions, the Finance Minister may revoke
the license of the securities firm, suspend all or a part of its business for a period of
not exceeding six months, or revoke or suspend the registration of the account
executive. 102 In practice, however, it is quite rare for the Minister to resort to
these weapons. Often it suffices merely to give a warning.
The Bill of Rights for customers, the so-called 'suitability' rule, 103 has given
birth to a premature baby in the Far East. In December, 1974, the Securities
Bureau set forth this principle in its release: a securities firm, when it solicits orders,
must take fully into consideration the customer's investment objectives, experience
and resources, and must refrain from indiscriminate recommendation of a few
stocks. 104 The Securities and Exchange Council in its recent report endorsed this
release, but advocated only further improvement of internal controls and
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employee education within securities firms. 1os The Securities Bureau said that,
when its staff inspected securities firms in 1975, it placed great emphasis on
whether the manner of soliciting orders was appropriate. 106 The Securities Dealers
Association of Japan promulgated a similar rule which requires, among other things,
that member firms keep customer cards containing specified information, such as
occupation, age, financial status, experience in securities investment, and invest-
ment objectives. 107 It is hoped that this infant will grow to be a statutory rule.
Article 54 relates to the financial soundness of a securities firm. Where a securi-
ties firm is in one of the following conditions, the Finance Minister may, to the
extent necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors, order it to alter its method of operations, suspend all or a part of
the business for a period not exceeding three months, escrow property, or take
any other necessary steps: (1) where the indebtness ratio exceeds or is likely
to exceed the maximum ratio stipulated by a ministerial rule (ten to one at the
present time); 108 (2) where the amount of borrowing, keeping, lending or hold-
ing of securities or other assets contravenes or is likely to contravene the standards
of soundness; or (3) where a securities firm is in a financial or business condition
stipulated by a ministerial rule as one which it is necessary to correct in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. "D9
In order to implement item (2) in the preceding paragraph, a ministerial rule
stipulates the following standards of soundness: (1) securities held in the account of
the securities firm itself must be limited to the minimum amount necessary to do
business, and must be diversified into many stocks and be in liquid form; (2)
loans, advances and loans of securities must be restricted to those which are neces-
sary to do business, and their amounts, periods, collateral and other terms must be
reasonable; (3) as to deposits, debts and borrowed securities, their amounts,
periods, interest and other terms must not be unsound in the light of the financial
state of the firm; (4) cash deposited by customers in connection with margin and
when-issued transactions must be kept separate from other assets, safely and in
liquid form; (5) as to securities deposited by customers, the amount must not be
excessive and the securities must be kept securely in safe facilities; and (6) as to
fixed assets, their amount must be within adequate limits in comparison with the
amount of net assets, and their size, structure and equipment must be reasonable in
the light of the business, the number of employees and their location. 110
The implementation of Item 3 of Article 54, paragraph 1, relates to both finan-
cial and business soundness. The Finance Minister may issue a correction order:
(1) where the amount of net assets is less than that of stated capital; (2) where the
state of current receipts and expenditures is unsound; (3) where the amount of bad
debts or other doubtful assets becomes substantial; (4) where a firm, as a matter of
business policy, engages in an excessive selling campaign to induce customers to
purchase stocks that are in the firm's inventory; and (5) where a firm underwrites
securities on grossly improper terms (amount, price, etc.) for the purpose of main-
taining or enhancing its position as an underwriter. 111
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol1/iss2/1
M. Tatsuta / Enforcenent of Japanese securities legislation
It is true that some of the soundness standards are clear-cut and unequivocal,
but most of them are phrased in a generalized manner and leave room for wide
discretion.
(3) Inspections
The Finance Minister is empowered to have his staff members inspect the busi-
ness condition, the assets and the books and records of a securities firm, if he
deems it necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 112 As of the end of 1976, there were 218 staff members engaged in
inspection, of whom 38 were assigned to the Inspection Division of the Securities
Bureau and 180 to the regional financial bureaus. 113
A securities firm is subjected to regular inspections every twelve to twenty-four
months. In cases of critical importance, extraordinary inspections have been carried
out. In both regular and extraordinary inspections, staff members review the books
and records that broker-dealers are required to keep.
Each year the Securities Bureau makes a check-list for carrying out inspections.
In 1976, the Bureau put stress on : (1) whether the firm's business attitudes vis-a-vis
its customers were acceptable; (2) whether its pricing of securities on the market was
fair; (3) whether the firm had a sound mix of assets and a sound receipts and
expenditures position; and (4) whether the firm's internal controls worked rigor-
ously., 14
In 1976, the Bureau inspected 442 offices of 137 securities firms. "' Its general
conclusions were that the business attitude of broker-dealers had improved year by
year, but that some of them insisted on a 'profit first' policy, neglecting their
customers' interests in connection with, among other things, solicitation of
orders. 116 It is impossible to assess the extent to which the suitability rule has
become rooted in Japanese soil, unless more detailed data are furnished by the
Bureau's annual reports.
In addition to the Securities Bureau's inspections, each stock exchange and the
Securities Dealers Association of Japan regularly and on special occasions inspect
their respective member firms. 117
B. Market surveillance
(1) Surveillance mechanism
In order to maintain fair and free pricing of securities in the market, the govern-
ment, the self-regulatory bodies and the major securities firms have united against
the common enemy, fraudulent and manipulative practices.
The Securities Bureau delegates eleven securities exchange controllers (torihi-
kisho kanrikan) to the eight stock exchanges (two each to Tokyo, Osaka and
Nagoya and one each to the other five). 118 In 1972, the Bureau established a
three-man special command team, informally referred to as 'market watchdogs'
(shie kanshihan), who now are assigned to its Secondary Market Division. 119 The
securities exchange controllers and market watchdogs, partly because of their small
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number, apparently play only a passive role, directing stock exchanges or securities
firms to investigate specified matters upon receiving notices from these exchanges or
firms that raise questions. They also give instructions to exchanges and securities
firms for improvements in their internal control systems. 120
Aside from this, the Bureau's regular inspection of securities firms mentioned
above is another method of ferreting out suspicious practices. For example,
inspectors stress in these inspections the search for manipulative conduct on the part
of securities firms, issuers and their related persons in connection with new issues;
on the'part of securities firms when they are distributing large blocks of securities;
on the part of 'peculiar' customers; 12 or on the part of anyone taking advantage of
inadequate disclosure or false information. 122 Upon finding something unusual
with regard to a specific stock, the Bureau carries out an extraordinary inspection
to determine the cause of a price change, the details of the transaction and the way
the price was determined. 123
Stock exchanges are expected to play a primary role in market surveillance.
Each exchange has staff members specifically assigned to watch stock prices. At
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, for example, three departments cooperate for this
purpose. Staff members of the Floor Department (shi]jbu) watch stock prices in
every post all the time, and, if any irregularity is found, take evidence from the
member firm concerned. If necessary, they warn the firm, or request the Market
Surveillance Department (baibai shinsashitsit) to carry out further investigation. The
latter department, when it suspects signs of manipulation or insider trading, orders
the member firm to submit sales reports, and holds hearings, if necessary. Where it
finds any transaction in contravention of statutes or the Exchange's rules, the
Department takes the steps necessary to prevent a recurrence and gives notice to
the Securities Bureau. The Member Examination Department (k~sashitsu), which is
in charge of inspecting member firms, tries to uncover manipulation, insider trading
and high pressure distribution of specific stocks in the course of its regular inspec-
tion and, if it discovers suspicious transactions, notifies the Market Surveillance
Department. Conversely, the Member Examination Department may carry out an
extraordinary inspection upon notice from the Market Surveillance Depart-
ment. 124 The three departments hold regular meetings to exchange information
and to study methods of improving their surveillance.
Universal securities firms 125 have been endeavoring to establish their own
internal stock watch systems pursuant to their autonomous rules since 1973. 126
For instance, Nomura Securities Company has a six-man corps (a Sales Review Sec-
tion in its Securities Review Department) to watch the firm's dealings in each stock
it has underwritten or is about to underwrite. The Section issues instructions to
each of the firm's branch offices to deal cautiously in such stocks, or if necessary,
to refrain from dealing in them for a certain period. As for stocks that have noth-
ing to do with the firm's underwriting business, its Stock Department constantly
checks whether irregularities have accompanied the firm's transactions. Most of the
smaller securities firms have not yet established such an internal watch system. 127
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(2) Manipulative practices.
The Securities and Exchange Law firmly prohibits wash sales, matched orders
and other forms of manipulation. The sanctions for violations are civil liability,
imprisonment at forced labor and/or fines. 128 Stabilizing transactions are per-
missible only for a limited period, at specified prices and by a limited class of per-
sons. 129 Because of the difficulty of proving the intent of the party concerned, the
Securities Bureau has resorted to the Soundness Rule to cope with manipula-
tion. 130
Since manipulation is most likely to take place during the so-called 'finance
period', i.e., between the time that an issuer begins sounding out the underwriter
about the feasibility of a new issue and the time that payment for the new issue is
made, the Japanese version of the [London] City Code, 131 contained in the
autonomous rules of the universal securities firms, focuses upon this period. These
rules require that during the period between the announcement of a new issue by
the issuer and the payment date therefore the securities firm must refrain, except
in lawful stabilizing transactions, from: (1) purchasing the stock for its own account
or the account of related persons (i.e., directors, executives, major shareholders and
affiliated corporations); (2) accepting orders to purchase the stock for the account
of the issuer's related persons; 132 and (3) soliciting purchases of the stock through
the firm's recommendation. 133
Some securities firms even extend the second of the above autonomous rules.
At least one firm refrains from accepting orders to purchase the stock for the
account of the issuer's related persons and the issuer's customers on the issuer's
request during the period between the time when the issuer decides upon the new
issue (even before its announcement) and the time when the price of the stock is
no longer affected by any stabilization activity (even after the payment date). 134
Universal securities firms also agree that they will carefully watch the price
movement, sales volume and details of sales in the stocks they underwrite during
the period between the announcement of the new issue and the payment date. 131
The purpose of this autonomous rule is to eliminate potential misconduct that
might arise from their dual roles of underwriter and broker. The rule is comparable
to the so-called 'Chinese Wall' within U.S. firms. As we have already seen, the uni-
versal securities firms have established their internal watch systems pursuant to these
autonomous rules.
When they sound out the Bureau with regard to a prospective new issue, an
issuer and its managing underwriter are required to submit a joint undertaking to
the effect that the stock has been priced fairly and that both parties will carefully
watch the price movement in the future. The Bureau requests a confirmation by
the issuer, at the time the amendment to the registration statement fixing the issue
price is filed, to the effect that the issuer has paid careful attention to the price
movement. 136
An issuer customarily mails a letter to its related persons stating that they are
prohibited from purchasing the stock for a specified period (during which stabiliz-
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ing transactions may take place) and asking that they abstain from purchases or
sales of the stock from the date of the letter (even before the beginning of the
stabilizing period) to the payment date. The managing underwriter keeps a copy of
this letter.
(3) Insider trading
It would be fair to say that one of the typical fraudulent practices in the securi-
ties field, insider trading, was not regarded as immoral until a vast number of
articles and columns burst into print, galvanized by the famous U.S. cases involv-
ing Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. and MerrilU Lynch. ' It is true that the Securities and
Exchange Law contains a provision compelling directors, supervisors and 10%
shareholders to disgorge their short-swing profits, 138 but the 1953 amendment
deprived the provision of its teeth by eliminating the insiders' duty to notify the
Finance Minister as to changes in their holdings. 139 As far as the writer knows,
there has been but one case, which is unreported, where this provision was resorted
to, and that was in connection with an internal management conflict. 140 As we
have already seen, the Japanese version of Rule 10b-5, Article 58 of the Securities
and Exchange Law, has remained dormant.
The Securities and Exchange Council, while urging that stringent regulation of
insider trading is necessary in order to make timely disclosures a reality, irritates
conscientious people by nonchalantly stating at the same time that it is sufficient
to make people recognize that insider trading is immoral because the new morality
will then become the basis of practice. According to the Council, considerable
progress has been made by the government, stock exchanges and securities firms
through improved stock watch systems and the review of sales orders at the time
they are received. 141
In 1971, the Securities Bureau warned the chairman of the then Federation of
Securities Dealers Associations that securities firms should be cautious in accepting
orders from insiders. 142 The Tokyo Stock Exchange issued a circular to its listed
issuers in 1972, calling attention to Article 189, the short-swing profit provi-
sion. 143 Three months later, the Exchange repeated the warning, pointing out that
the general public was increasingly concerned over transactions in the securities
markets. 144 As has been already noted, the twelve universal securities firms agreed
upon autonomous rules to establish internal stock watch systems, and, pursuant to
these rules these firms will refuse orders from related persons when, to the firm's
knowledge, they were based upon inside information. 145
The government, stock exchanges and major securities firms may have taken
necessary steps when suspicious transactions were discovered, but no publicity
has been given to such cases, perhaps to save face for the unlucky scapegoats
or for fear of losing the public's confidence in the stock market. Bearing this and
the Council's irresolution in mind, wouldn't those warnings cited above sound like
mere dog howlings? It is high time that a new and effective statute is adopted. 146
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(4) Cooling the overheated market
The securities industry as a rule welcomes a bullish market. If the market is
exceedingly excited, however, it is usually the public investors -who are hurt, as they
board the rising elevator near its top after the professional operators have gotten
off.
In November, 1972, stock prices rose at an accelerated rate: the Tokyo Dow
rose from 4781.48 at the beginning of the month to 4909.24 in the middle of the
month, and to 5207.94 at the end of the month. Average sales volume per day in
that month on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange reached over 556.6
million shares (year-round average per day was approximately 197.4 million shares
in 1971, and 327.8 million shares in 1972). 141 The Securities Bureau, on Decem-
ber 1, 1972, gave the following instructions to the 22 securities firms under its
direct control: (1) they were not to increase loans to customers for margin trans-
actions in excess of the balance at the end of November; and (2) the ceiling for
holding securities for their own account was to remain the same as in 1971, despite
the otherwise permitted expansion because of the increase in their net assets. 148
The Bureau also notified investment trust companies of the suspension of the
otherwise permitted expansion of the maximum amount of their trust funds. It
further requested underwriters to limit the number of shares allotted to persons
designated by the issuer to half of the total number of new shares, and to set the
price for new issues of outstanding stock as close as possible to the market price
at the time of issue. Lastly, the Bureau requested commercial banks not to increase
their percentage of holdings in a stock. 149 On the same day, the stock exchanges
raised the cash deposit ratio of bond for margin transactions to a flat rate of
20%. 1so
Since the fever continued in spite of these measures, the Ministry of Finance
revised its rule on margin transactions to raise the margin rate (bond) from 60% to
70%. The stock exchanges increased the cash deposit required to be made by the
securities companies to a ratio of 30%. Moreover, on the same day, January 9,
1973, the Deputy Minister of Finance summoned the presidents of the Big Four to
warn them to take positive steps to control speculative activities in their firms and
to make efforts to calm the securities market. 1"1 Mr. Segawa, then chairman of the
Tokyo Securities Dealers Association, issued a circular to the member firms, and
Mr. Morinaga, then president of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, published a statement
addressed to investors at large and the the member firms, both to similar effect and
on the same day. "s2 As the market had not calmed down, the Deputy Minister,
Mr. Segawa and Mr. Morinaga repeated their actions on February 21, 1973. 1s3 On
the same day, the Securities Bureau conducted an extraordinary inspection of
several broker-dealers to see whether stock pricing was being distorted because of,
for example, speculative funds and/or broker-dealers' operations, as had been sus-
pected by the general public. 154
Although the Tokyo Dow monthly average did not fall from the peak of
5359.74 on January 24, 1974 to below 5000 until April (4770.54), the average
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sales volume per day on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange showed a
sharp decline from about 626.2 million shares in January to 316.3 million shares
in February, and to 156.5 million shares in March of that year.
C. Noah s ark
Just the opposite of the preceding account is the story to be told next: measures
taken in the face of a desperate bear market. Let us turn back the clock by about
a decade before the scene we have just described. After July, 1962, when the
Tokyo Dow marked its peak at 1474.83, the stock market slid downward. While it
recovered and reached an even higher point at 1634.37 in April, 1963, it thereafter
again declined. On July 19, 1963, when President Kennedy proposed the interest
equalization tax, stock prices plummeted, and at the end of the month the index
was at 1386.98. This so-called 'Kennedy shock' and his assassination in November
gave double blows to the weak market, which had already been staggered by the
unsatisfactory balance of payments, the increase in the reserve ratio required
against deposits, and above all the prevailing forecast of a worsening recession. The
matter of greatest concern then became how to defend the 1200 line which it
appeared the Tokyo Dow was about to cross. IS6
(1) National pools
It goes without saying that an oversupply of stocks in comparison with shrunken
demand was the underlying cause of this sluggish market. 17 In order to absorb
and freeze the new supply of shares, the Japan Joint Securities Company, Ltd.
(Nippon Ky~d5 Shaken Kabushikigaisha) was formed on January 20, 1964 by
twelve city banks, two long-term credit banks and the Big Four. 158 This corpora-
tion was registered as a dealer and,subsequently, uponthe effectiveness of the 1965
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law, obtained a license in September,
1967. The corporation's declaration of business policy stated that it proposed,
among other things, to adjust supply and demand in stocks, bring equilibrium to
-the stock market, and thereby develop the capital market. 159
In addition to its 30 billion yen of stated capital, Joint Securities obtained its
working capital by borrowing 100 billion yen from city banks and 67.8 billion yen
from Nippon Securities Finance Company, the latter loan having originated from
the Bank of Japan with stocks lent by various industries as collateral. 160 With this
war chest, Joint Securities bought approximately 1.6 billion shares of about 189.7
billion yen in book value, and subscribed for approximately 200 million new shares
of 10.2 billion yen in book value that were alloted to it as a shareholder, and took
them all out of the market. 161
The chilling blizzard of the depressed stock market was so harsh that Joint
Securities needed help. Thus another pool, the Japan Securities Holding Associa-
tion (Nippon Sh~ken Hoyl Kumia) was organized on January 12, 1965 as a civil
partnership by 56 stock exchange member firms. 162 Unlike Joint Securities, the
Holding Association was not a dealer, but was organized just to acquire stocks from
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investment trusts and the securities firms that had formed the partnership through a
limited number of purchases, and to hold them for a period not longer than three
years. Purchases from a partner firm were on condition that the seller would buy
back the stock for the same price at the time of market revitalization. 163 In addi-
tion to the partner's contributions of approximately 17.3 billion yen, the Holding
Association obtained loans of 164.6 billion yen from Nippon Securities Finance
Company, again originating from the Bank of Japan, and purchased about 2.1
billion shares of about 232.8 billion yen in book value. 164
In this way, the national unity front, with the mighty vacuum cleaners of Joint
Securities and the Holding Association, sucked 3.7 billion shares out of the stock
market during the most critical period (amounting to 5% of the total number of
shares listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 74.7 billion shares
in 1965). The 1200 line was defended. Securities firms and investment trusts, freed
from the heavy load of their holdings and the menace of stock oversupply, were
able to devote themselves to their ordinary business, selling and buying stocks, and
some elite issuers regained the opportunity to float their shares, though under
rather stringent qualitative and quantitative restrictions. Also, with signs of business
recovery, the stock price upturn enabled the two pooling organizations to sell their
holdings, bit by bit. The Japan Securities Holding Association was dissolved on
January 11, 1970, and the Japan Joint Securities Company was dissolved on
January 30, 1971, both after having emptied their portfolios, and with huge
profits. 165
Let us draw a curtain by just quoting the Securities Bureau's remarks on these
allied operations.
Joint Securities, though a dealer in form, should rather be regarded as an institutional
investor in its substance. It is true that its formation and operations were criticized as incon-
sistent with the principle of a free stock market. But against the background of present-day
Japan with its paucity of powerful institutional investors, an institution like Joint Securities
may well claim its raison d'etre. 166
The Holding Association is a manifestation of an attempt by securities companies to freeze
out excessive shares by themselves, and thereby to improve supply-demand relations. This
design, while unrealizable without an understanding and cooperation by financial authorities, is
an epoch-making step in the history of the Japanese capital market. 167
(2) Repair the cracked dike
Against the background just seen, most securities firms were badly off. Yamaichi
Securities Company, one of the Big Four, reported a huge deficit in its accounts as
of the end of September, 1964. Yamaichi had devoted itself heavily to dealer
business and had a long lead on other firms in the race to become managing under-
writer for those 'upper middlers' that had gone public in previous boom years. Over-
all, this exacerbated its position as stock prices went down, leaving it with a heavy
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burden of sticky stocks of lower quality. In November, 1964, the president of
Yamaichi Securities was replaced by Mr. Hidaka, a former executive of a long-term
credit bank. The new management, while attempting to remedy the firm's situation
by reducing the number of its offices and employees, and disposing of idle proper-
ties, found it difficult to improve the firm's financial position without outside help.
On May 21, 1965, Yamaiehi announced its rehabilitation plan, including a
moratorium on interest payments on loans from 18 banks. This aroused serious
anxiety among people who associated that step with bank failures in the days of the
Great Depression, and a kind of run on the firm took place. 168 There were signs
that this run might spread to other firms.
On May 29, the Finance Minister, Mr. Tanaka, granted permission to the central
bank to make special loans to Yamaichi pursuant to Article 25 of the Bank of
Japan Law. 169 In their press conference the previous day, the Minister and the
Governor of the Bank of Japan had asserted their firm resolution to take the
necessary steps, stressing the need to protect the public investors, not the need to
save the securities firms. Along this line, eight special loans totaling 28.2 billion yen
were granted to Yamaichi through three major banks, without any collateral except
notes issued by Yamaichi and without any limitation on the loans. 170 This was a
first in the history of the Japanese securities industry. The disturbance rapidly
calmed down; the emergency had passed.
A year later, on June 11, 1966, Yamaichi announced its revised rehabilitation
plan, including scheduled repayments of the special loans. A newly-formed corpora-
tion, which obtained the first license as a securities firm under the 1965 amend-
ments to the Securities and Exchange Law, succeeded to the business of the fatally
wounded firm. " Because of the revived stock market in 1968-69, the new
Yamaichi firm made remarkable profits, and paid back the special loans in full by
the end of September, 1969. 172
Taking this costly mishap as a lesson, securities firms, under the direction of the
Securities Bureau, have made efforts to ameliorate their condition by putting more
emphasis on their brokerage business and reducing current expenditures so as to
enable themselves to exist on commission revenues, while keeping their underwriting
business within reasonable limits. 173
5. Sanctions: some case studies
There have not been many cases where formal proceedings, juducial or adminis-
trative, have been taken under the Securities and Exchange Law. In this Section, we
will take a look at some typical cases of such proceedings in connection with
serious violations.
A. San 'y5 Steel case
Tiis case is unusual in that it had immeasurable influence upon not only the
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Japanese economy but also on Japanese society at large and brought about amend-
ments to both the Securities and Exchange Law (1966) and the Commercial Code
(1974). 174
San'y6 Special Steel Co., Ltd. (San )'5 Tokushu Seik5 K.K.) was one of the lead-
ing manufacturers of special steel, with 3,700 employees, 7.38 billion yen of stated
capital, and liabilities even to foreign banks. On March 6, 1965, the company
applied to the court for relief under the Corporate Reorganization Law, on the
ground that it would not be able to honor its promissory notes of 1.8 billion yen
that were about to become due without serious impairment of its ability to con-
tinue in business.
San'y5 Steel had distributed dividends and paid bonuses to its management
from 'surplus' for seven consecutive years prior to this application for relief.
However, the court proceedings and the Securities Bureau's inspection revealed
that the company had had deficits in most of these years, and had made false
entries in its financial statements amounting to approximately 13.1 billion yen in
total, almost twice the amount of its stated capital. 175 The company had issued
new shares to more than double its stated capital in 1960, and the management had
thought it necessary to continue dividend distributions in order to satisfy the share-
holders and to make additional new issues possible. The company thus devised a
plan to create sham profits by adding false sales, hiding some of its manufacturing,
general administrative and selling costs and eliminating some liabilities from its
books. 176
The Securities Bureau lodged an accusation in the public prosecutor's office
against the company and its president pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Law
because of untrue statements in its periodic reports. This was the first time in the
history of that law that such an action had been taken. 177 The Bureau also revoked
the registration of the certified public accountant who had knowingly given an
unqualified audit certificate about the false financial statements of the company. 178
The company brought a civil suit for damages against 15 of its executives, and
the court decreed assessments of damages for which the defendant directors and
supervisors were liable pursuant to Article 266 of the Commercial Code. 179
However, civil suits by investors based upon the Securities and Exchange Law have
never been brought.
B. NTV case
Nippon Television Network Corporation (Nippon Terebi H"sm5 K.K.), with
stated capital of 1.2 billion yen, announced on June 24, 1969 its plan to increase
the stated capital to 2.5 billion yen by issuing new shares, partly (1.2 billion yen)
through a rights offering at par value and partly (100 million yen) through a non-
rights offering at the current market price. Upon reviewing the registration state-
ment filed on September 17, 1969 for these new issues, the Securities Bureau found
that the company's surplus had been overstated by approximately 896 million yen
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through overstating prepaid expenses, hiding certain accrued expenses and under-
estimating depreciation expenses. At this point, the market price of the stock was
already ex-rights and at about 1400 yen (the tum-rights price had been roughly
2400 yen).
The Securities Bureau feared that exposure of the 'window-dressing' would dis-
turb the stock market. The Bureau simply expected that the new issue project
would be withdrawn at NTV's initiative, through persuasion by the underwriters.
However, NTV gave up only its scheduled non-rights offering and filed a voluntary
amendment to the registration statement in connection with the planned rights
offering pursuant to Article 7 of the Securities and Exchange Law. The Bureau
accepted this! It merely extended the waiting period pursuant to Article 8, para-
graph 3, of the law, and the registration statement became effective on October
16, 1969. Thus, NTV was able blatantly to accomplish its project of raising addi-
tional capital funds. The Bureau, on December 17 of the same year, issued an order
requiring the amendment of the periodic reports which had been filed by NTV. 180
The Securities Bureau argues that it does not have any statutory power to sus-
pend an ongoing new issue. 181 It could, however, have applied to the court to issue
an injunction. 182 The Bureau also argues that it was not completely sure of the
total amount of the falsified figures, which, according to the Bureau's interpreta-
tion, is a prerequisite for issuing an order requiring an amendment pursuant to
Article 10 of the Securities and Exchange Law. According to the Bureau, it would
have taken considerable time to collect all of the evidence and hold hearings before
issuing an order, and such a delay would have had worse repercussions than the
prompt publication of the issuer's voluntary amendment. 183 But who agrees with
this view? Isn't the Finance Minister empowered to issue a stop order 184 for the
very purpose of suspending this sort of fraudulent offering? The only consolation
is that the Bureau frankly stated the facts and its views in its annual report. One
certainly hopes that the Bureau has discarded this sort of timid interpretation.
C. Ky&d6 Shiry6 case
Ky~d5 Shiry5 Co., Ltd., a feed manufacturer, with stated capital of 2.3 billion
yen, had been listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. On July 26,
1972, the company announced a plan to increase its stated capital to 3.5 billion yen
by issuing 11.5 million new shares at par value through a rights offering and 12.5
million shares at current market value through a non-rights offering, with the new
shares to be paid for on November 30. The market price of the stock, around 150
yen on July 1, and 177 yen on July 26 when the plan was announced, kept on
rising and reached its all-time high of 265 yen on September 22. During this period
of less than two months; the stock rose 49%, while both the Tokyo Dow and the
stock of another feed manufacturer showed only a 14% rise. After the ex-rights
date (September 27), the stock remained at about 230 yen, and the company set
the issue price for the non-rights offering at 200 yen on November 10. After the
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payment date, the stock showed a slight downward movement, while the Tokyo
Dow continued to rise until late January of the next year. Average sales volume
per day in the company's stock, which had been 226,000 shares in June 1972,
increased to 425,000 shares in July, and thereafter decreased, and remained at
about 20,000 shares from October on. 185
The public prosecutor's office instituted a prosecution against the company and
two of its executives, and against a branch manager in each of the Daiwa, Nikk5
and Nomura securities firms, the first two firms being the managing underwriters
for Ky6d6 Shiry6. The charge was that the company, with the aid of the securities
firms, had manipulated its stock price up to the contemplated issue price in order to
raise capital funds on favorable terms. 186 This criminal proceeding is still pending.
The Securities Bureau, after holding hearings on March 29, 1973, suspended the
business of the branch office concerned of each of the three securities firms for a
period of three days on the ground that these firms had acted in contravention of
the Soundness Rule. 187 The Tokyo Stock Exchange imposed the same disciplinary
sanction and in addition imposed a penalty of 500,000 yen each on Daiwa and
Nikk5 and 400,000 yen on Nomura. The Exchange also assigned Ky~d6 Shiry6
stock to a special post in preparation for its delisting. 188
D. Nihon Netsugaku case
This is a case in which a number of audacious violations were committed. Nihon
Netsugaku K~gy6 Co., Ltd., a manufacturer of air-conditioning equipment,
attracted much attention as a rapidly-moving dark horse; it was formed in 1957,
listed on the second section of Osaka Stock Exchange in 1972 and the Tokyo Stock
Exchange in 1973, and was 'promoted' to the first section of both the Tokyo and
the Osaka exchanges on May 1, 1974, with stated capital of approximately 1 billion
yen.
Twenty days thereafter, on May 20, 1974, the company applied to the court for
relief under the Corporate Reorganization Law, having dishonored about 500
million yen of its promissory notes. The court appointed a leading accounting firm
as an investigator. The police made inquiry and the Securities Bureau carried out
inspections. These studies revealed several illegal acts by Nihon Netsugaku.
For three years up to the end of 1973, the company had issued false financial
statements that inflated its net profits by 4.24 billion yen. It had recorded fictitious
sales, underestimated its construction costs, and so on, thereby concealing large
deficits. Based upon these untrue financial statements, the company made three
public offerings, in December 1972, June 1973, and December 1973, in which it
raised a total of more than 30 billion yen.
It was alleged that officials of Nihon Netsugaku conspired to manipulate the
company's stock price, which had fallen from a high of 1470 yen on March 7, 1974
to 960 yen on May 10, affected by bad news about the company. In order to main-
tain the stock price above 1000 yen, these company officials were said to have
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placed a series of buy orders with Yamaichi Securities Co., its managing under-
writer, and other brokers whereby they purchased 237,000 shares for the com-
pany's account, making use of subcontractors and others as nominees during the
period between May 9 and 15. 189
At the same time, between February 15 and May 9, 1974, four company
officials were apparently selling their own shares, 880,000 in total, knowing the
desperate financial state of the company. 190
The court refused to apply the Corporate Reorganization Law on the ground
that there was no prospect of rehabilitating the company. The Securities Bureau
lodged an accusation against Nihon Netsugaku and nine of its officials. The public
prosecutor's office also instituted a prosecution against them. Six of the accused
individuals were sentenced to imprisonment for a period of ten months each, with
suspension of the sentence for two years. 191 The proceedings against the other
three accused, including the president, are still pending.
Two certified public accountants who were found to have given false audit
certificates were summarily sentenced to a fine of 150,000 yen each, and were
suspended from their business for one year. 192
The Securities Bureau, after holding hearings on January 23, 1975, suspended
the brokerage business of Yamailchi's Osaka branch for two days for violation of
the Soundness Rule. 193 On the same day, the Osaka Stock Exchange imposed the
same disciplinary sanction plus a penalty of 500,000 yen, and the Tokyo Stock
Exchange suspended a part of Yamaichi's brokerage business for the same period.
The Securities Dealers Association of Japan imposed a penalty of 500,000 yen on
January 27. 194
6. Conclusion
A U.S. SEC staff member might well be surprised at the extreme obedience of
Japanese securities companies and issuers. A British merchant banker might well
envy the big umbrella the Japanese securities industry enjoys. A U.S. federal judge
might wish to be transferred to a Japanese court to get rid of the Rule 10b-S
nuisance. But some U.S. practicing lawyers may wonder what their Japanese col-
leagues live on.
It is true that the Japanese people are not as litigious as those of the U.S. But
this is not the only answer. In Japan, there are no class actions or contingent
fees available for investors and securities lawyers. Moreover, the number of attor-
neys is quite small, 11,035 in June 1977 (the population is approximately 110 mil-
lion). Readers should understand that, in the light of sparse litigation in the field of
securities regulation and. the Securities Bureau's patriarchal administration, the
demand for more securities lawyers is not strong.
Broker-dealers and issuers may continue to refrain from quarreling with the
government. However, investors, who have been silent, may become more talkative
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as consumerism rises. A case for class action or group action (Verbandklage) is
gradually acquiring support, but one hurdle seems to be the decrease in the number
of individual investors because of low average stock yields. If issuers continue with
a low dividend policy, they will dig their own graves by distorting the foundations
of capitalism.
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1 Sh~kentorihkihW, Law No. 25 of 1948, as amended by Law Nos. 4 and 5 of 1971 (herein-
after cited as SEL).
2 ShOken tbshishintakuhb, Law No. 198 of 1951.
3 Gaikoku sh5kengaisha ni kansuru horitsu, Law No. 5 of 1971. As to the gist of these two
laws and the rules thereunder, see Tatsuta, Securities Regulation in Japan 102-06, 122-24
(1970).
4 The Constitution of Japan (Nipponkoku kemnpb), art. 7, item 1; art. 74.
- National Administrative Organization Law (Kokkagyasei soshikihb), Law No. 120 of
1948, art. 12.
6 SELart. 125, para. 3.
7 Rule for Enforcement of Securities and Exchange Law (Shakentorihldiho shikbrez),
Cabinet Rule No. 321 of 1965, as amended by Cabinet Rules No. 150 of 1971 and No. 167 of
1977 (hereinafter cited as SEL Enforcement Rule), art. 20 through art. 26.
8 Ministerial Rule Concerning Filing of Stabilizing Transactions (Anteisasa torihiki no
todok-eide t5 kansura sh~rei), Ministry of Finance Rule No. 43 of 1971 as amended by Ministry
of Finance Rule No. 61 of 1971.
9 SEL art. 4 through art. 11; art. 24 through art. 24-3, art. 24-5; art. 27-2.
10 SEL art. 28 through art. 37, art. 53, art. 54; art. 81 through art. 85-2, art. 111, art. 112,
art. 120, art. 154 through art. 156; art. 156-3 through art. 156-14.
11 SEL art. 67 through art. 78.
12 SEL art. 62 through art. 64-4.
13 Certified Public Accountants Law (Kanhikaikeishihb), Law No. 103 of 1948 (herein-
after cited as CPA Law), art. 19-2, art. 30 through art. 32, art. 34-21,
14 SEL art. 26, art. 55, art. 76, art. 154, art. 156-13; CPA Law art. 33, para 1;art. 34-21,
para 2.
'5 SEL art. 187.
16 Criminal Procedure Code (Keiisoh8Jz), Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 239, para. 2. Penal
provisions are found in SEL art. 197 through art 207 and CPA Law art. 50 through art. 53-3.
17 In pre-war times stock exchanges, commodity exchanges, stock broker-dealers and com-
modity broker-dealers were all under the control of the then Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try (Shakash5), the predecessor of the present Ministry of International Trade and Industry
or MITI (Tsiisansh5). The administration of stock exchanges and stock broker-dealers was trans-
ferred to the Ministry of Finance in 1941. In 1948, when the SEL was enacted, an independent
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (Shbkentorihiki ikal) was established after
the model of the U.S. SEC. To simplify the administrative structure, however, this commission
was abolished in 1952, and its functions were absorbed by the Ministry of Finance. At that
time, the Ministry of Finance had only three relevant divisions under its Financial Bureau
(Rizaikyoku). Constant and rather rapid expansion of these divisions, along with the remark-
able growth of the securities industry, were responsible for the creation of the Securities Bureau
with five divisions in 1964.
18 Co-ordination Division (S0muka); Capital Market Division (Shihonshiltka); Corporation
Finance Division (Kigybzaimuka); Secondary Market Division (Ryzatsishijaka); Securities Coni-
panies Division (Gybmuka); and Inspection Division (Kensaka).
19 Those domestic corporations whose stated capital is less than 100 million yen and whose
securities are not listed on any securities exchange must file their statements and reports with
the director of the regional financial bureau of the district in which the corporate head office
is located. Ministerial Rule Concerning Public Offering or Secondary Distribution of Securities
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(Yi2kashtoken no boshii inatawa uridashi no todokeide tO ,i kansuru shorei), Ministry of
Finance Rule No. 5 of 1973 (hereinafter cited as 'Registration Rule'), art. 20.
20 Nomura, Nikk6, Yamaichi and Daiwa;see n. 45 infra.
21 On Delegation of Business Relating to Securities Companies (Shokengaisha ni kansuru
iinu no in ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zasha) No. 680, Apr. 1, 1968. The criteria
for the Bureau's direct control are that the securities company must have stated capital of 500
million yen or more and that it must have at laast one office within the Tokyo district. In
addition, some of the 28 companies are under the Bureau's direct control because of their
extraordinary nature, although they do not meet these criteria.
22 See Section 4(C) infra.
23 See Sections 3(A) and 4(B)(3) infra.
24 The Ministry of Finance attracts the highest ranking students who have passed the
national civil servant examination of the highest grade, many of them being graduates of the
University of Tokyo. These elite members of the staff, listed on the so-called List A, are
promoted quickly in a way that gives them experience in many positions in various bureaus,
including the position of head of small local tax offices within the first five or six years of their
employment. Since a good record in one position is indispensable for the next promotion,
they make an intensive study of each new assignment, become expert in a surprisingly short
period of time, and are quite careful not to make any mistakes. Other members of the staff,
who have also passed a national examination, but not of the highest grade, are listed on the so-
called List B and rise in rank less rapidly, in many cases remaining within a single bureau. Since
they stay longer in one position and are familiar with jobs closely related to that position,
they become real experts and support the continuity of administration in a specified area. See
lkeda,Okurash6 Sh6kenkyoku (Securities Bureau, Ministry of Finance) 107 (1969). Until
recently, the director of the Securities Bureau was rotated approximately every two years,
but now rotation takes place almost every year.
2s SEL art. 165.
26 SEL art. 166, art. 167, art. 169. As of May 23, 1977, the members' occupations areas
follows: former vice-chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizations; editorial writer of a
leading newspaper; president of a housing loan company; president of a securities finance
company; professor emeritus of law; president of the Tokyo Stock Exchange; chairman of the
Life Insurance Association of Japan; executive vice-president of a leading steel company;
executive vice-president of a long-term credit bank; executive director of the Bank of Japan;
executive director of the Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan; president of a semi-
governmental bank; and chairman of the Securities Dealers Association of Japan.
27 Ordinance concerning the Securities and Exchange Council (Shakentorihiki shingikairei),
Cabinet Rule No. 410 of 1952, art. 2.
28 Law Establishing the Ministry of Finance (Okurasha setdziho), Law No. 144 of 1949,
art. 17, para. 2; Ordinance Concerning the Financial Accounting Council (Kigyokaikei shingi-
kairet'), Cabinet Rule No. 307 of 1952, art. 2, art. 5. At present, the Council has twenty mem-
bers: six of them, including the chairman, are accounting professors; two are professors of law;
two are accountants, i.e., the president and a vice-president of the JICPA; one is the chairman
of the Japanese Federation of Tax Consultants Associations; four are representatives of indus-
trial circles; one is vice-president of the Tokyo Stock Exchange; one is director of the Civil
Bureau, Ministry of Justice; and three are directors of the Tax Bureau, the National Tax
Administration Agency and the Securities Bureau, Ministry of Finance, respectively. In addi-
tion, there are sixteen temporary members and three associate members with similar positions
and background.
29 Regulations Concerning the Terms, Form and Method of Preparing Financial Statements
(Zainushohiya t6 no yago, y~shiki oyobi sakuseihah ni kansuru kisoku), Ministry of Finance
Rule No. 59 of 1963 (hereinafter cited as Financial Statement Regulation); Regulations
Concerning the Terms, Form and Method of Preparing Consolidated Financial Statements
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1978
M. Tatsuta / Enforcement of Japanese securities legislation
(Renketzu-zainushohyb t0 no y~go, y5shiki oyobi sakusei-hzh5 ni kansurn kisoku), Ministry
of Finance Rule No. 28 of 1976. These regulations are based upon SEL art. 193. Both the
Financial Accounting Principles and the Financial Statement Regulation have been amended
several times.
30 Ordinance Concerning the Financial Accounting Council, art. 9.
31 CPA Law art. 36.
32 CPA Law art. 35.
33 In 1976, the Tokyo Stock Exchange accounted for 84.7% of the volume of shares
traded on all exchanges; the next most active was the Osaka Stock Exchange, which accounted
for 11.6% of the volume.
34 SEL art. 81 through art. 83.
3s SEL art. 85-2, para. 1; art. 110; art. 112.
36 SEL art. 103, art. 111,art. 119, art. 156.
37 SEL art. 155, para. 1, item 1.
38 Kabushik! Ryttsfkkika no Seibikaizen ni tsuite (On the Improvement of Facilities for
Stock Trading), 1968 Okurash6 Sh6kenkyoku Nemp6 (Annual Report of the Securities Bureau,
Ministry of Finance) 250-51. Annual Reports of the Securities Bureau are hereinafter cited,
with date, as SB Ann. Rep.
39 1969 SB Ann. Rep. 172-75.
40 Although it has not been uncommon that some of the non-member directorships of a
stock exchange were filled by former officials of the Securities Bureau, until recently presidents
were almost always elected from among member directors. That has changed. The former
president of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Mr. Morinaga, was once deputy minister of the Minis-
try of Finance and is now the Governor of the Bank of Japan. Mr. Tanimura, now President of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, served as deputy minister of the same ministry and as Chairman of
the Fair Trade Commission. The President of the Osaka Stock Exchange, Mr. Matsui, was the
first Director of the Securities Bureau.
41 At one time, there were 33 associations of securities dealers, averaging nearly one in each
prefecture, and some securities firms were not members of any association. The Securities and
Exchange Council in 1964 suggested that in order to achieve more effective self-regulation the
multiplicity of associations should be replaced by a new national association of securities firms,
and it advocated that membership in the association be required of all securities firms. From
1965 to 1967, the Japan Federation of Securities Dealers Associations and local associations
made a study of their future organization and functions, and formulated policies to carry out
these recommendations. Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 78-79 n. 50. On May 1, 1968, the 33
local associations were integrated into ten new associations, and as of July 1, 1973, these ten
were again consolidated into one single association, similar to the U.S. National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). 1968 SB Ann. Rep. 236-38; 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 89-90. As a
result, SEL art. 79, relating to a federation of securities dealers associations, became a dead
letter.
42 SEL art 67 through art. 78.
43 The Administration Control Agency (Gy~seikanrichO) even suggested that all matters
relating to the registration of account executives be delegated to the Association, in order to
reduce the administrative burden on the government. 1976 SB Ann. Rep. 33-36. Some of the
directors of the Association are former members of the staff of the Securities Bureau.
44 Issuers desire to have their stock listed on stock exchanges as soon as they meet listing
standards, and they make use of the over-the-counter market only as a stepping stone to
exchange listing. In 1961, three major stock exchanges established a 'second section' to absorb
the over-the-counter market. Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 82 n. 14. Stock exchange members
are prohibited from dealing in listed stocks off the exchange floor, which makes it impossible
for a Third Market to develop except in debt securities. Constitution of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, art. 23.
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4- 'Universal securities company' (sdg6 shaken) is a common term for a securities firm that
has licenses to engage in all types of securities business without any limitation on the amount it
can underwrite for each issue; in other words, it is a broker-dealer-underwriter. Autonomous
rules were at first agreed upon by the "Big Four" universal securities companies (Nomura,
Nikk5, Yamaichi and Daiwa), later joined by eight other such companies (Shinnippon, Nippon
Kangy6 Kakumaru, Wak6, San'y6, Yamatane, Osakaya, Okasan and Daiichi). They estab-
lislied the following rules: Autonomous Rules Concerning Stock Prices (Kabukakeisei ni kan-
suiru ishu rule) of March 29, 1973; On Improvement of Stock Watch System (Kabuka-kanshikikb
no seibikakuiff ni tsuite) of June 1, 1973; Agreement Concerning Improvement of Service
Regulations on Employees Engaged in Transactions with Corporations (H6inkankei-shain no
fukumukitei seibi i kansuru mnshiaivase) of June 18, 1973; Criteria on New Stock Issues at
Market Price (Jikahakkb-zsishi ni kansuru kangaekataJ of February 10, 1973, as revised on
October 1, 1976; and Criteria on Issues of Convertible Debentures (Tenkanshasai-hakko ni kan-
sum kangaekata) of February 13, 1973, as revised on September 30, 1976. 1974 SB Ann. Rep.
46-48; 1977 SB Ann. Res. 75,79-80.
46 CPA Law. as amended by Law No. 85 of 1966, art. 43, art. 46-2. 1967 SB Ann. Rep.
49-51.
47 CPA Law art. 19, para. 3;art. 46-11, para. I and para. 2.
48 CPA Law art. 46-11, para. 4 and para. 5.
49 CPA Law art. 46-13.
So Members of the Conference Concerning Coordination of Capital Increase are the follow-
ing: Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance (chairman); Deputy Minister, Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry; Deputy Governor, the Bank of Japan; Secretary General, Federation
of Economic Organizations; President, Tokyo Stock Exchange; Chairman, Tokyo Stock
Exchange; Chairman, Securities Dealers Association of Japan; Chairman, Federation of Bankers
Associations of Japan; President, Japan Securities Finance Corporation; Chairman, Life
Insurance Association of Japan; and Chairman, Marine and Fire Insurance Association of Japan.
Yamaichi Shaken, Shikinchftatsu Handbook (Capital Raising Handbook) 85 n. 1 (1972). For
background information about the development of the existing practice, see id. at 85 n. 2;
Kogayu, Zshikiseisochi no teppai ni tsuite (On Repeal of Restrictive Measures Relating to
Capital Increase), No. 381 Sh6ji H6mu (Commercial Law Review) 6-7 (1966): Kogayu,
Shitsutekei z~shichasei no jisshiiOkyO ni tsuite (On Present Enforcement of Qualitative Coordi-
nation of Capital Increase), No. 358 Sh6ji H6mu 2 (1965). Mr. Kogayu, the last-cited author,
was the then associate chief on the Corporation Finance Division, Securities Bureau, Ministry of
Finance.
At present, the heads of the underwriting departments of each of the Big Four meet almost
every week, and those of twelve other universal securities companies hold monthly meet-
ings, to carry out coordination and to review compliance with their autonomous rules.
s 1 By-law on Capital Increase (Zashi toriatsukai naiki) of May 12, 1966. It requires that the
ex-right market price of stock of 50 yen par value shall be 60 yen or more, that the issuer
shall have been paying dividends at the rate of 10% or more of the par value, and that the net
profit return to common stock after tax shall be such as to permit the maintenance of the
dividend rate. An exemption may be granted to issuers in regulated industries whose dividend
rate is controlled by the government, to financial institutions and in cases where the raising of
capital is urgent and highly important.
52 On Proper Operation of Underwriting Business by Securities Companies (Shakengaisha
no hikiukegyinu no tekiseina un'ei ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zsh0) No. 2677,
Nov. 6, 1969 (hereinafter cited as Proper Underwriting Release). This release urges that
exemptions be granted with great caution.
s3 Criteria on New Stock Issues at Market Price of October 1, 1976, supra n. 45. Its origin
dates back to February 10, 1973.. 1974 SB Ann. Rep. 8, 16-18. After several amendments
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thereto, the current Criteria require, inter alla, that the issuer have paid at least five yen per
share as dividends in the most recent year; that the issuer had current profit after tax of ten
yen or more per share in that year; that the amount of the new issue does not exceed the
stipulated ceiling; and that the issuer had already distributed free shares to the shareholders
equivalent to at least 20% of the premium obtained from the previous issue.
Before the new issue of 6 million shares at market price by Nippon Gakki (Japan Musical
Instruments Corp.) in October 1968, rights offerings at par value used to be a common practice
regardless of current market price. Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 3. Even after the replacement
of this practice by offerings at current market price, issuers persisted in the traditional dividend
policy, declaring dividends at the same percentage of the par value as before, which meant a
considerable decrease in actual yield. Various interested groups, including the securities indus-
try and institutional investors, argued that issuers should increase the number of outstanding
shares by a share distribution and a concurrent transfer of the capital surplus obtained from the
premium (the excess of the issue price over the par value) to stated capital as stipulated by
article 293-3 of the Commercial Code, in order to increase the total amount of dividends paid
to the shareholders. The Criteria on New Stock Issues at Market Price incorporates this argu-
ment and requires that any premium obtained be repaid to the shareholders in the abovemen-
tioned way within a specified number of years. The Securities and Exchange Council strongly
requests that issuers comply with this rule. Securities and Exchange Council, On Change in
Shareholder Structure and Way of Capital Market (Kabunushi-k~sei no henka to shlhonshi#6 no
arikata ni tsuite), May 11, 1976 (hereinafter cited as Way of Capital Market Report), at 12-13.
S4 Proper Underwriting Release, supra n. 52; On Administration of Review of Registration
Statements (Yflkashaken-todokeidesho to no shinsaimnu no unlei ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance
Release (zdsho) No. 1144, May 29, 1972 (hereinafter cited as Review Release); On
Accomplishment of Business Attitude of Investors First (Tashishahon 'i no eigyoshiseino tette!
ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zbshb) No. 2211, Dec. 2, 1974 (hereinafter cited as
ss Way of Capital Market Report, supra n. 53, at 26. An underwriter is liable for damage
caused by a material misstatement in a registration statement unless he proves that he was not
aware of such misstatement and that he took due care; however, due care need not be proven
with respect to misstatements in financial statements audited by a CPA. SEL art. 21, para.
1, item 4, and para. 2, item 3. This article is inconsistent with article 17, which imposes liability
for use of an untrue prospectus, because article 21 dispenses with the defense's need to prove
due care in regard to audited financial statements. The same inconsistency appears between See-
lion 11(b)(3)(C) and Section 12(2) of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933. Kawamoto, Shihonshif6
ni okern rippcronteki kadai (ge) (De lege ferenda Problems of Capital Market, Pt. II), No. 741
Sh6ji H6mu 5 (1976).
S6 1976 SB Ann. Rep. 83. On December 12, 1974, the Chairman of the JICPA issued a
circular to the member accountants to the effect that the auditing accountant of an issuer
should investigate and report to the managing underwriter so far as feasible when requested
by the latter. Saitl, Comfort Letter no sakuseiy)ry6 (Check Points in Filling Out a Comfort
Letter), No. 717 Sh6ji Hdmu 24, 29 (1975). The model form of a comfort letter is based upon
the AICPA's Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 48.
s7 Kaneko, Hiniuke-shinsa to comfort letter; sh~kengaisha no tachiba kara (Review of
Underwriting Issue and Comfort Letter from the Viewpoint of a Securities Company), No. 717
Sh6ji H6mu 20, 21 (1975).
S8 The 'propriety' in underwriting demanded by the Securities Bureau (see, e.g., Proper
Underwriting Release, supra n. 52) is construed to include the underwriter's compliance with
the autonomous rules. The Bureau asks the managing underwriter to submit a checklist showing
its compliance with the autonomous rules with respect to the pending new issue, and then
reviews it.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol1/iss2/1
M. Tatsuta / Enforcement of Japanese securities legislation
Quantitative adjustment may be designed primarily for the purpose of preventing the stock
market from being depressed by a flood of new issues. Qualitative adjustment, on the other
hand, may have two functions: to weed out shady issues, and to attain proper allocation of
capital. The latter objective is expressed, both in the autonomous rules and in the Bureau's
release as follows: "to adjust new issues taking into account urgency and significance of the
use of the proceeds". Criteria on New Stock Issues at Market Price, supra n. 45; On Way of
Underwriting Business by Securities Companies Under the Current Economic Circumstances
(Tamnen no keizailosei no moto ni okeru shkengaisha no hikiuke-gyamu no arikata ni tsuite),
Ministry of Finance Relsease (zosha) No. 3359, Dec. 25, 1973. This release, along with that of
the Banking Bureau addressed to financial institutions to the same effect, forms a part of the
government's tight money policy to curb total demand.
S9 Criteria of Rating Corporate Debentures Issued by Public Offering (Kabo ]igyasaika-
kuzuke kijun); Yamaichi Sh6ken, op. cit. supra n. 50, at 411-13. Seven universal securities
companies (see n. 45 supra) joined the Conference from June 1973 on, encouraged by the
report of the Securities and Exchange Council advocating a termination of the Big Fours
oligopoly in the underwriting business. Securities and Exchange Council, Way of Bond Market
Pursuant to Vicissitude in Domestic and Foreign Economic and Financial Circumstances (Naigai
no keizai-khi'yzi-jbseino henka nitomonau k~shasaishifjno arikata nitsuite), February 5, 1973;
1973 SB Ann. Rep. 75-78; 1974 SB Ann. Rep. 14.
60 1974 SB Ann. Rep. 14; 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 10. An expert subcommittee of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Council recently made a proposal that the Floation Conference should be
dissolved in order to enhance competition. Nippon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic
Journal), September 29, 1977, at 1.
61 SEL art. 4, art. 24, art. 24-5. Contents of a prospectus are, as a rule, identical with those
of Part I of the registration statement. SEL art. 13, para. 2; Registration Rule, supra n. 19, art.
12.
Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Commercial Code, most corporations had accounting
periods of a half-year, which required them to file their periodic reports semi-annually. The
1974 amendments introduced a provision (Commerical Code art. 293-5) permitting the board
of directors to declare interim dividends (chi'kanhaito), and many corporations then shifted
to an annual accounting period. In the case of these corporations, a 'periodic report' means an
annual report, and they are required to file a semi-annual report as well.
62 SEL art. 193-2. Until quite recently, a semi-annual report had only to contain summary
financial statements that did not need to be audited. However, responding to the Securities
and Exchange Council's recommendation that credibility of semi-annual reports be enhanced
by participation of CPAs therein, the Financial Accounting Council announced an opinion
with regard to interim financiaI statements on March 29, 1977. Based upon this opinion, the
Registration Rule and two other relevant ministerial rules were amended as of August 30, 1977,
with the result that semi-annual reports were required to contain interim financial statements
prepared in accordance with certain standards and audited by a CPA. Way of Capital Market
Report, supra n. 53, at. 31; No. 799 Sh6ji H6mu 41-42 (1977).
63 SEL art. 10, para. 1; art. 24-2, para. 1; art. 24-5, para. 3.
64 SEL art. 10, para. 1. Similar sanctions are applicable to tender offer statements (kkai-
kaitsuke todokeidesho). SEL art. 27-2, para. 2.
65 SEL art. 24-2, para. 2. Since this provision does not apply to semi-annual or current
reports, investors are likely to be unaware of the fact that such reports have been amended,
unless the investors frequent a public reference room.
66 SEL art. 11, art. 24-3. The purport of these provisions is that the reckless issuer should
be kept from making public offerings until the turmoil caused by its gross misstatement abates.
Watanabe et al., Kaisei Sh6kentorihikih6 No Kaisetsu (Comments on the Amended Securities
and Exchange Law) 74 (1971).
67 Review Release, supra n. 54.
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68 Regulation Concerning Solicitation of Proxies for Listed Stock (Jaj6 kabushiki no
giketsuken no dairikdshi no kan'ya ni kansuru kisoku), Securities and Exchange Commisssion
Regulation No. 13 of 1948 (hereinafter cited as Proxy Regulation), art. 6. This regulation,
promulgated by the defunct commission (see n. 17 supra), has the force of a cabinet order.
SEL Supplementary Provisions section 2 (1952). The original Proxy Regulation required that
drafts of proxy materials be filed ten days prior to their dissemination to the shareholders. This
advance review was discarded in 1955, mainly because of pressure by business interests.
69 Proxy Regulation, supra n. 68, art. 7 prohibits the solicitation of proxies by the use of
untrue materials, but there is no express provision authorizing the Finance Minister to publicize
misstatements in proxy materials. An injunction is provided for in SEL art. 187.
70 In addition to the candidate's principal occupations or employment during the last five
years and the number of shares he owns, "any (fimancial) interest relationship the candidate
holds or held with the corporation" must be disclosed. Proxy Regulation, supra n. 68, art. 2,
item 3. In a few exceptional cases, a loan from the corporation to the candidate or fringe
benefits granted to him have been described in connection with this requirement. Scholarly
interpretation of the requirement is that matters likely to cause a conflict of interest between
the director and the corporation must be disclosed. Yazawa, Giketsuken no Dairikashi (Voting
by Proxy), No. 119 Kaih6 30 (Tokyo Kabushiki Konwakai) 1961.
71 Compare SEC Rule 14a-6; Schedule 14A and Schedule 14B; J.1. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Jennings, Federali-
zation of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. Law. 991, at 1016-19 (1976).
Japanese shareholders do not have the right to present proposals for inclusion in the proxy
statement, such as is provided in SEC Rule 14a-8.
72 SEL art. 24-5, para. 2. While a current report or a copy thereof is kept for public inspec-
tion at the Securities Bureau, the principal and major branch offices of the issuer, and either the
stock exchanges on which the security is listed or the Securities Dealers Association of Japan, if
the security is not listed on an exchange, the fact that the report has been filed is not publicized.
Therefore, investors have no way to become aware of the filing unless they frequent a public
reference room. It is true that facts that are or should be stated in current reports are likely to
be reported by news media, but a reasonable estimate of the effect of such facts upon tile
financial condition of the issuer may be made only by inspecting the fied report. The statute
requires only that a current report be filed 'without delay', without specifying any deadline.
73 Registration Rule,supra n. 19, art. 19. See Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 116-117.
74 Way of Capital Market Report, supra n. 53, at 31-32.
75 Request Concerning Timely Disclosure of Corporate Information (Kaishajehzi no
tekijikaiji i kansuru ysei), Circular (tasha jakan) No. 525, June 7, 1974.
Rule 2, para. 1, of the Regulations for Supervision of Listed Securities (Jajlyatkashaken
kanrikijun) of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (published in Listing of Securities Regulations of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange 22 (1975)) provides as follows:
"The issuer of a listed security shall promptly give notice to the Exchange when one of the
following items occurs:
(1) Dishonor of any bill or check or suspension of any bank account.
(2) Allegation of initiation of procedure of company reorganization or for initiation of
liquidation pursuant to the provisions of law or de facto liquidation.
(3) Suspension of business activity.
(4) Considerable change in the nature of business.
(5) Heavy loss from disaster.
(6) Commencement of legal proceedings which may have influence on the listing of the
securities.
(7) Other serious business problems."
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76 Nojiri, Kaishabh6 tekijikaiji no jaijitsu ni tsuite (On Improving Timely Disclosure of
Corporate Information), No. 735 Sh6ji H6mu 42, 43 (1976). The Tokyo Stock Exchange
delisted the violator, Yoshida Tekk6sho (Yoshida Steel Work, Inc.). 1976 SB Ann. Rep. 472.
The Exchange's senior staff lamented that management of listed corporations had little under-
standing of the importance of timely disclosure and were reluctant to provide such disclosure.
Nojiri, id.; Sakuma, Kaishal6ha no tekifikaiji ni kansuru y~sei ni tsuite (On the Request Con-
cerning Timely Disclosure of Corporate Information), No. 671 Sh6ji H6mu 2, 3 (1974).
77 On Notification to the Exchange and Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Informa-
tion (J'iy'na kaishaahb no honsho eno tsakoku oyobi tekijikaiji t ni tsuite), Circular (t~sh5
jakan) No. 687, Dec. 22, 1975.
Rule 3 of the Regulations for Supervision of Listed Securities of Tokyo Stock Exchange
(published in Listing of Securities Regulations of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 22-23 (1975))
provides as follows: "The issuer of a listed security shall promptly furnish the Exchange on
demand with accurate information which the Exchange may require for supervision and regula-
tion of trading in the listed security".
In accordance with the request in the second circular, almost all of the listed corporations
appointed senior executives as their spokesmen and registered them with the Exchange. Nojii,
op. cit. supra n. 76, at 44.
78 On the Import of the Requests Concerning Timely Disclosure of Corporate Information
(Kaishajoha no tekijikaiji ni kansuru ysei no shushi ni tsuite), Circular (tOshO jdkan) No. 172,
April 12, 1976.
79 Kanzaki, Tekijikaiii-seisaku no jafitsu (Improvement of Timely Disclosure Policy), 1
Gendai Shdh6gaku No Kadai G6) (Problems of Contemporary Commercial Law Study, in
Honor of Dr. Suzuki for his 70th Birthday) 127, 133-34 (1975). Professor Kanzaki suggests
that an issuer in violation of the policy be delisted and the directors be liable for damages.
Id. at 151-52.
80 Law Concerning Exceptions from the Commercial Code with regard to Auditing Stock
Corporations (Kabushikigaisha no kansa to ni kansuru shahb no tokurei ni kansuru haritsu),
Law No. 22 of 1974, art. 2. A CPA audit of financial statements contained in reports to be filed
with the Finance Minister is a different matter, and had been required even prior to the 1974
amendments. See n. 62 supra. These financial statements were prepared on the basis of annual
accounts approved by the shareholders meeting. The 1974 amendments extended the period
between the close of fiscal year and the date of the annual shareholders meeting from two
months to three. Commercial Code art. 224-3, para. 2 and para. 3. This means that annual
accounts to be presented to the shareholders meeting are prepared and audited simultaneously
with financial statements which have to be filed with the Finance Minister. SEL art. 24, para.
I. In order to eliminate inconsistencies between these documents, the Financial Statement
Regulation, supra n. 29, was amended along with the Regulation governing the annual accounts
under the Commercial Code. Regulations Concerning Balance Sheet, Income Statement and
Schedules of Stock Corporations (Kabushikigaisha no Taishakutaishohy3, Son'ekikeisansho
oyobi Fuzokumeisaisho ni kansuru Kisoku), Ministry of Justice Rule No. 31 of 1963, as
amended in 1974 (hereinafter cited as Corporate Accounts Regulation).
81 Prior to the 1974 amendments, most corporations used to publicize their accounts
within approximately one month from the close of the (usually semi-annual) fiscal period.
Nojiri, J5]6gaisha no Kessanhappya no Jokya to Mondaiten (Present Situation and Problems
of Publicizing Annual Accounts by Usted Corporations), No. 741 Shoji H6mu 9, 10 (1976).
82 Ibayashi, Kaiseishi5ha Tekiydka ni okeru Keidanren no Kessankankei-shorhshin ni
isuite (On the Federation of Economic Organizations' Guidelines for Processing Annual
Accounts under the Amended Commercial Code), 27 Accounting (Kigyakaikei) 660 (1975).
See id. at 667-76 for the guidelines issued by the Committee on Economic Laws (Keizaihaki
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Uinkat) of the Federation of Economic Organizations.
83 On Request Concerning Publication of Annual Accounts (Kessanhappy5 ni kansun
y~b5 ni tsuite), Circular (tsh5 j516) No. 189, April 26, 1976 and Circular No. 126, April 12,
1977.
84 Timely Disclosure and Audit (Timely disclosure to kansa), JICPA Circular, Feb. 14,
1972.
85 Way of Capital Market Report, supra n. 53, at 31.
86 Yazawa, Tekiikaii-seisaku to Kaishakessan no Ka5hyjiki (Timely Disclosure Policy
and the Time to Publicize Corporate Annual Accounts), No. 737 Shrji H6mu 2,5 (1976).
87 SEL art. 28, para. 1. The term 'securities business' (shakengy) is defined as "any
business involved in one of the following activities by any person other than a bank, trust
company, or other financial institution designated by a cabinet rule: (a) sale of securities;
(b) sale of securities as an intermediary, broker or agent; (c) commissioning of a sale order to
be executed on a securities exchange as an intermediary, broker or agent; (d) underwriting of
securities; (e) secondary distribution of securities; and (f) arrangement for a public offering or
secondary distribution of securities". SEL art. 2, para. 8. A stock corporation (kabushikigaisha)
is governed by the Commercial Code, arts. 165 through 456.
88 Exchange Law (Torihikishoho), Law No.5 of 1893, art. 10; Securities Installment Sales
Business Law (Yffkash~ken kappuhanbaigyaha), Law No. 29 of 1918; Securities Business
Control Law (Yfikashakengy5 torislzimariho), Law No. 32 of 1938; Securities Underwriting
Business Law (Ytkashzken hikiukegyJo), Law No. 54 of 1938.
89 Law No. 22 of 1947.
90 See Section 4(C) infra.
91 See the following three publications by the Securities and Exchange Council: On
Problems Concerning Broker-Dealers (Shdkengyasha ni kansuru shomondai ni isuite), Feb. 12,
1964, 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 109; On License System (Menkyoseinitsuite), Oct. 16, 1964, 1965
SB Ann. Rep. 120; and On the Problems of Licensing Broker-Dealers (Shukengyasha no mnei-
kyosei to no ,nondai ni tsuite), Dec. 22, 1964, 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 123. Among the arguments
for the license system were that broker-dealers should be treated the same as other financial
institutions, which were licensed; and that the Finance Minister had no choice but to register
a broker-dealer who met the requirements under the registration system. Opponents' argu-
ments, on the other hand, included the points that government intervention without solid
criteria would -be susceptible to bureaucratic control over the entire economy; and that the
Finance Minister had exerted, by way of administrative guidance, controlling power over
broker-dealers in a manner similar to that under a license system, and hence there was no need
to change from the registration system. The staff of the Ministry of Finance were at first
reluctant to press for the revision because of their fear of the eventually heavier responsibility
that would accompany their greater authority. Suzuki and Kawamoto, Shkentorihikih6
(Securities and Exchange Lav) 79-84 (1968); Miyashita, Kaisei Shakentorihikih Sei-sharei
no Kaisetsu (Comments on the Amended Securities and Exchange Law, Cabinet and Ministerial
Rules Thereunder), Special Issue No. 1 Bessatsu Shji Hmu 3 (1965).
92 SEL art. 28, para. 2. Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 68. A firm having all four types of
license is a universal securities company. See n. 45 supra.
93 SEL art. 32, item 1; SEL Enforcement Rule, supra n. 7, art. 15. The list of minimum
capital requirements is supplied in Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 69 n. 5.
94 SEL art. 31. At the request of the securities industry, the Securities Bureau issued a
release designed to clarify the criteria. Its wording, however, remains nonspecific, with the
exception of one requirement that the amount of net assets must exceed the amount of stated
capital and the indebtedness ratio ( aggregate indebtedness divided by net assets) be ten or less.
On Matters to Be Considered in Connection with Licensing Securities Business (Shakengya
no menkyo nt atari kentasubeki fiko ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zdsh)) No. 685,
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March 23, 1967; 1968 SB Ann. Rep. 28. During the grace period for then-existing broker-
dealers between October 1, 1965 and March 31, 1968, the Securities Bureau energetically gave
guidance, including advice as to mergers, tailored to each broker-dealer in order to improve
its firancial status. 1968 SB Ann. Rep. 27.
9s SEL art. 32.
96 Suzuki and Kawamoto, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 90.
97 SEL art. 29.
98 Miyashita, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 4. With regard to segregation of broker and dealer
functions, the Securities and Exchange Council took the position that it would not pursue
drastic measures toward segregation but would try to eliminate hazards deriving from a
securities firm's engaging in both broker and dealer businesses. On the Problems of Licensing
Broker-Dealers, supra n. 91. The Council recently endorsed its 1964 pronouncement. Way of
Capital Market Report, supra n. 53, at 27-28.
99 1968 SB Ann. Rep. 39.
100 Other sources of administrative control, such as revocation of license, permit or
approval, and special reserves required, are summarized in Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 71-78.
One of the difficulties felt by the Securities Bureau in applying article 58 lies in its abstract
wording and supposed requirement of an intent to defraud. Suzuki and Kawamoto, op. cit.
supra n. 91,at 101 n. 1.
101 Ministerial Rule Concerning Standards of Soundness for Securities Companies (Shaken-
gaisha no kenzensei no junsoku t5 ni kansuru shbrez), Ministry of Finance Rule No. 60 of
1965 (hereinafter cited as Soundness Rule), art. 1. This rule is, so to speak, a codification of de
facto standards previously applied in administrative guidance. Suzuki and Kawamoto, op. ciL
supra n. 91, at 100.
102 SEL art. 35 and art. 64-3. There have been eight cases of administrative sanctions on
account of violations of article 50; all were violations of the Soundness Rule, art. 1, item 3
(see n. 101 supra). The sanctions were suspension of a part of the business for one to three
days.
103 U.S. NASD Fair Practice Code, Rule 3(2); SEC Rule 15b10-3.
104 Investors First Release, supra n. 54. This release also urges strict conformity with an
earlier release with respect to accepting discretionary accounts: On Self-Discipline of Securities
Transactions in Discretionary Accounts (YrikashOken no baibai-ichininkan]b torihiki no
jishuku ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zai) No. 926, Feb. 7, 1964. The latter release
urges that a securities firm refrain from accepting transactions in discretionary accounts except
on the customer's insistent request, notwithstanding the permissiveness of the SEL with respect
to such transactions if the firm complies with certain requirements. SEL art. 127; Regulation
Concerning Discretionary Accounts of Securities (Yakashaken no baibaliichininkanje ni
kansuru kisoku), Securities and Exchange Commission Rule No. 15 of 1948. This general
discouragement of discretionary accounts reflects the occurrence of disputes in connection with
such accounts.
1o Way of Capital Market Report, supra n. 53, at 27.
106 1976 SB Ann. Rep. 194. The inspectors were assigned to investigate the situations of,
and the details of transactions by, 'peculiar' customers, such as those who invested a huge
amount of money, who gained or lost a great deal, who concentrated in dealing in specified
stocks, or who only sold or only bought. Id.
107 Rule Concerning Investment Solicitation and Customer Administration by Member
Firms (Kybkaiin no t~shikan'yi, kokyakukanri t5 ni kansuru kisoku), Fair Practice Code
No. 9, Feb. 19, 1975, art. 3. The Rule Concerning Stock Sales and Other Transactions on Over-
the-Counter Market (Tento ni okeru kabushiki no baibai sonota no torihiki ni kansuni kisoku),
Fair Practice Code No. 1, June 18, 1976, art. 13, prohibits member firms from offering one-
sided inducements to purchase over-the-counter stocks and from soliciting inexperienced
customers to buy such stocks.
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108 SEL Enforcement Rule, supra n. 7, art. 16; Ministerial Rule Concerning Securities Com-
panies (Shakengaisha ni kansuru shoreD), Ministry of Finance Rule No. 52 of 1965 (hereinafter
cited as 'Securities Company Rule'), art. 6. Prior to the 1965 amendment, the government used
as a standard for measuring the indebtedness of a securities company a type of liquidity ratio
which in a simplified form may be described as follows:
current liabilities - -<! 20
current assets - current liabilities -
Use of this measure turned out to be ineffective in preventing securities companies from reck-
less expansion by means of excessive borrowings. In simplified form, the new measure adopted
in 1965 may be shown as follows:
aggregate liabilities < 10
net assets
This may be translated into an equity ratio of around 9.1% which is vulnerable to a criticism
that it is too low. Suzuki and Kawamoto, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 120-122. Even before the
1965 amendment, a measure similar to the present one was introduced by way of administra-
tive guidance. On Financial Administration of a Securities Firm (Shokengyosha ho zainukanri
tO ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zOri) No. 5304, July 5, 1963; 1964 SB Ann. Rep.
190-96. See also Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 74.
109 SEL art. 54, para. 1.
1 10 Soundness Rule, supra n. 101, art. 2.
111 Soundness Rule, supra n. 101, art. 3.
112 SEL art. 55.
113 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 183. See also text supra at n. 21.
114 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 182.
's Id. at 183.1 1 6 Id. at 184.
" Each stock exchange has its Inspection Rule (kensa kitezj, based upon the provisions
of its constitution authorizing the exchange to inspect its member firms. The Rule enumerates
matters to be inspected in detail. It also provides that the exchange is to give notice in advance
to a firm that is about to be inspected. The Securities Dealers Association of Japan has an Audit
Rule (kansa kisoku), also based upon its constitution. Audit does not differ from inspection
and is carried out mainly by checking the manner of keeping securities deposited by customers.
I " 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 108, Table 81 (1).
119 1972 SB Ann. Rep. 106; 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 107.
120 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 110. The Secondary Market Division is equipped with a displayer
for QUICK (Quotation Information Center K.K.), and automated quotation service system, but
the securities exchange controliers' rooms are not.
121 As for 'peculiar' customers, see n. 106 supra.
122 1976 SB Ann. Rep. 123.
123 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 110.
1 2 4 Id. at 107.
125 See n. 45 supra.
126 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 107, 110; On Improvement of Stock Watch System, supra n. 45.
127 1977 SB Ann. Rep. 108, Table 71 (3); 110.
128 SEL art. 125, para. 1 and para. 2; art. 126; art. 197, item 2. See Tatsuta, op. cit. supra
n. 3, at 87.
129 See nn. 6-Bsupra, and Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 118-19.
130 For example, the Nomura Securities Company was required to suspend its business
in connection with a public offering of convertible debentures by Nippon Tsuun in 1966. The
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Bureau acted similarly with respect to Nikko Securities Company and Yamaichi Securities Com-
pany in connection with public offerings of shares by Yamashita Shinnippon Steamline and
Showa Marine in 1967. The anti-manipulation provisions of Article 125 were resorted to in the
Ky6d5 Shiry5 Case, see Section V(C) infra. On the Soundness Rule, see n. 101 and text at nn.
110, 111 supra.
131 The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers ('City Code'), issued by the City Working
Party, is administered and enforced by the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, a body representa-
tive of those using the United Kingdom securities markets. According to the Introduction to
the City Code, the duty of the Panel is the enforcement of good business standards, not the
enforcement of law. Copies of the City Code may be obtained from the Panel at P.O. Box
No. 226, The Stock Exchange Building, London EC2P2JX, England.
1 32 Repurchase by an issuer of its own shares is prohibited. Commercial Code art. 210.
Tatsuta, Patterns of Restricting Share Reacquisitions by Corporations, 6 Law in Japan: An
Annual 128 (1973). The Code says nothing about purchases by a subsidiary of shares in its
parent corporation, nor is there any case law on this point. Scholarly interpretation is divided as
to what subsidiaries are prohibited from purchasing shares in the parent. Tatsuta, Kogaisha ni
yoru Cyagaisha-kabushiki no Shutoku (Subsiduaries' Purchase of Shares in the Parent Cor-
poration), 3 Gendai Sh6h6gaku No Kadai (ge) (Problems of Contemporary Commercial Law
Study, in Honor of Dr. Suzuki for his 70th Birthday) 1459 (1975). Proposed amendments to
the Commercial Code have a provision that a subsidiary whose majority shares are held by its
parent corporation shall not acquire shares in the latter. Ministry of Justice, Tentative Draft
for Amending the Stock System (Kabushikiseido ni kansuru kaisei-shian) III 7 (May 1977).
One of the universal securities companies makes it its own rule that the firm refrain from
accepting an order by a subsidiary where the parent's holding therein exceeds 70% to 80%.
Nomura Securities Company, Underwriting Dept., Jika finance ni kansuru ryTijik6 (Check
List for New Issues at Market Price) 4 (1976). This brochure is for the firm's internal use.
133 Autonomous Rules Concerning Stock Prices, supra n. 45; 1974 SB Ann. Rep. 48.
134 Nomura Securities Company, Underwriting Dept., op. cit. supra n. 132, at 4.
13- On Improvement of Stock Watch System, supra n. 45; 1974 SB Ann. Rep. 46.
136 Nomura Securities Company, Underwriting Dept., op. cit. supra n. 132, at 5.
137 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), commented on by
Tatsuta, 1970 Amerikah5 (American law) 100; 446 F. 2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), commented on
by Takeuchi, 1972 Amerikah6 370; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968); In the Matter of Investors Management Co.
(SEC), CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. [para.] 78, 163 (1971), comented on by Tatsuta, 1973 Ameri-
kah 299. A great number of comments on these cases have appeared in addition to those cited
here.
138 SEL art. 189, modeled after section 16(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
139 SEL art. 188, modeled after section 16(a) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See Yazawa, The Legal Structure for Corporate Enterprise: ShareholderManagement Relations
under Japanese Law, Law in Japan 547, 557 (Von Mehren ed. 1963). This repeal was a stain
on the history of Japanese securities regulation. Takeuchi, Naibusha torihiki (Insider Trading),
41 Shaken Kenkyri (Study on Securities) 139 (1975).
140 Shokusan Jiitaku Co., Ltd., a house construction company, brought an action against
its former chairman to recover his short-swing profits of more than 1.1 billion yen. The chair-
man had been arrested on the charge of tax evasion in connection with his income, totaling
approximately 3.8 billion yen, derived from dealings in the company's stock. Yomiuri shimbun
(Yomiuri Journal), Sept. 4, 1973, at 18.
141 Way of Capital Market Report, supra n. 53, at 32, 33.
142 On Prevention of Mishaps (Jikobbshi ta ni tsuite), Ministry of Finance Release (zbshi
hi) No. 452, Feb. 24, 1971; No. 553 Sh~ji H~mu 32 (1971). Contents of the release have been
kept confidential.
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143 On Dealings by Issuers' Related Persons in the Stock in the Issuer (J5jfgaisha no
kankeisha nt yort Jishakabu no baibai-torihiki ni tsuite), Circular (t~sh5 ijkan) No. 1621, Nov.
17, 1972.
144 On Adequate Disclosure of Financial Information and Dealings in the Issuers' Stock
(Zaimunaiy5 no tekiseikaii oyobi Jishakabu-baibai ni tsuite), Circular (ishb '51kan) No. 120,
Feb. 16, 1973.
145 On Improvement of Stock Watch System, supra n. 45; Agreement Concerning Improve-
ment of Service Regulations on Employees Engaged in Transactions with Corporations, supra
n. 45. See also text at nn. 125-127 supra.
146 Inquiry on Corporation Law Reform (Kaishah5 kaisei ni kansuru ikensh~kai), circu-
lated by theMinistry of Justice to various organizations on June 12, 1975, contains the question
(in III 6): "What do you think of the argument that the corporation law should have a provi-
sion preventing management from taking advantage of inside information?" In the answers,
pros outnumbered cons by a small margin. Inaba, Analysis of Opinions Concerning the Corpora-
tion Law Reform (Kaishah kaisei ni kansuru kakukal iken no bunseki), No. 728 Sh~ji H~mu
18 (1976). The writer introduced to the Conference on Economic Law held in October 1976 a
proposal for an insider trading statute, modeled, with some modifications, after The American
Law Institute Federal Securities Code, Tentative Draft No. 2, sections 1303, 1402 (f), 1409
(1973). Tatsuta, Naibusha-torlhiki ni kansuru hritsu-shian to teianshushi (A Proposal for an
Insider Trading Statute and Comments Thereon), No. 746 Sh~ji H6mu 2 (1976); Tatsuta,
Naibusha-torihiki no k~ka ni kansuru ripparonteki k.satsu (De lege ferenda Reflections on
Relief as to Insider Trading), Kigy6h5 No KenkyTa (Studies on Business Law, in Honor of Dr.
Ohsumi for his 70th Birthday) 698 (1972).
147 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 31, Table 14. This stock rise has been attributed to (1) the
unexpectedly good performance of corporations that was publicized in that month, coupled
with even better projections for the subsequent half-year period; and (2) the attainment of
1000 in the NYSE Dow-Jones Industrial Average on November 14, 1972, reflecting the
prospect of a Vietnam ceasefire. Id. at 36.
148 Id. at 36. See also n. 21 supra with respect to securities companies under direct control
of the Bureau's head office.
149 Id. at 37. The Bank of Japan gave similar guidance to the commercial banks. During the
period of easy money, many corporations had invested their idle funds in stocks, shifting from
their investments in land which had led to rocketing land prices and ultimate enactment of a
special discouraging surtax statute to ease the public's harsh burden; also, banks had dis-
couraged the repayment of loans, and had made a tacit threat not to lend anew when needed
to those who insisted on making repayment. Most conspicuous were the giant trading com-
panies, some of which made profits from dealing in stocks in amounts comparable to those of a
large broker-dealer. This hectic corporate investment race gave rise to serious economic, social
and political problems. Individuals' shareholdings, which had been constantly decreasing from
over 60% in 1950 to 39.93% in 1960, reached the bottom at 32.71% in 1972 (33% in 1976).
1977 SB Ann. Rep. 98 Table 65(1); Zenkoku Shbkentorihikisho (All Stock Exchanges in
Japan), 1976 Kabushiki Bumpuj6ky6 Ch~sa (Survey of Shareholdings), Table 3 at 9 and Chart
2 at 10 (1977). The embarrassing effects of this phenomenon upon the stock market, corporate
management and the economy as a whole forced the Securities and Exchange Council to con-
sider methods of remedying the distortion. Way of Capital Market Report, supra n. 53. Not-
withstanding the writer's disagreement with several aspects of the report, it moves in the right
direction by combining several approaches, including regulation of reciprocal shareholdings and
elimination of double taxation. Id. at 9, 16.
Another aftermath of the investment race was the tightened Anti-Monopoly Law. In addi-
tion to the previous overall ban on holding companies whose sole purpose was the control of
other corporations, and restrictions on corporate acquisitions of shares which might have
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anticompetitive effects, the 1977 amendments (though retreating from the original proposal
by the Fair Trade Commission announced in 1974) introduced several new provisions which
presumably have had effects upon the stock market. These new provisions include one that
limits the aggregate value of shares that may be owned by the giant non-financial corporations
to their stated capital or net assets, whichever is higher, and another that reduces the limit on
share ownership by a financial institution (excluding insurance companies) in another corpora-
tion from 10% to 5% of the total outstanding shares of the issuer, thus returning to the pre-
1953 amendment standard. Law Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Security of
Fair Trading (Shitekidokusen no kinshi oyobi k~seitorihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h~ritsu),
Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended by Law No. 63 of 1977.
1so 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 37. As to bonds for margin transactions, see Tatsuta, op. cit. supra
n. 3, at 99.
15 1 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 37. As a result of the increase by the stock exchanges in the margin
rate requirement, broker-dealers had more cash, which was itself a new problem. In
order to absorb this additional cash, the Ministry of Finance amended the Soundness Rule,
supra n. 101, on January 16, 1973, to add a provision requiring that cash deposited from
customers in connection with margin and when-issued transactions be kept separate from other
assets, safely and in liquid form, and requested member firms to deposit a certain percentage
of cash bonds with the respective stock exchanges. On Handling Deposited Bonds in Connec-
tion with Margin Transactions (Shin'y5-torihiki ukeire-hoshakin no toriatsukai ni tsuite),
Ministry of Finance Release (z~sh) No. 111, Jan. 16, 1973.
152 Tokyo Securities Dealers Association, Circular (tbsh~ky5 (so) 48) No. 16, Jan. 9,
1973; Tokyo Stock Exchange, Circular (tbshs) No. 2, Jan. 9, 1973.
153 Tokyo Securities Dealers Association, Circular (tshakyb (sb) 48) No. 22, Feb. 21,
1973; Tokyo Stock Exchange, Circular (t~shsa) No. 20, Feb. 21, 1973.
154 Minutes of the Finance Committee, House of Representatives, 71st Diet (No. 9, Feb.
28, 1973) at 105.
155 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 36; 1974 SB Ann. Rep., Table 8 at 21.
156 1963 SB Ann. Rep., Table 100 at 91; 1964 SB Ann. Rep. 43-46, Table 17 at 361;
Arakawa, Sh6ken Ky6k6 Zengo (Before and After the Stock Crisis) 138-39 (1967).
1S 7This oversupply was brought about by several causes. The economic prosperity
triggered by the rapid growth in the late 1950s stimulated a vast demand for funds, a part of
which was raised by stock issues. The effect was to increase the aggregate amount of stated
capital in corporations listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange by 6.1 times
during the decade between 1956 and 1964. Many upper-middle issuers vied with each other
to go public in order to be listed on exchanges, and underwriters waged cut-throat competi-
tion to unearth those golden eggs. Investment trusts also expanded by nearly 10 times during
the same decade, reaching for increases in size for competition's sake. Once economic growth
slowed down, these factors, and increased reciprocal shareholding among corporations, all
impacted heavily upon the stock market at about the same time during the last years of the
decade ending in 1964. Arakawa, op. cit. supra n. 156, at 28, 109, 121, 139.
1 S 8 The initial amount of the stated capital was 2.5 billion yen, which rose to 30 billion yen
in November of the same year through four new issues, with 57 regional banks, 7 trust banks,
20 life insurance companies and 15 additional securities companies joining as shareholders.
1965 SB Ann. Rep. 62. The reason why city banks took the initiative for this project was that
they had begun to find it difficult to meet the demand for funds by industry in the face of a
tight money tendency. In that situation, these banks had either to reduce the money demands
they were apparently facing or to attempt to collect their loans (which would then likely
become bad debts because the banks had loaned in 1963 about 60% more than in the previous
year). Arakawa, op. cir. supra n. 156, at 141.
15 9 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 62. The declared business policy was in accordance with the quali-
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fieation attached to the license granted the corporation.
160 Id. at 63. As regards a securities finance company, see Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at
100.
161 1970 SB Ann. Rep. 35.
162 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 64. A civil partnership (khumiai) is provided for in the Civil Code,
arts. 667 through 688.
163 Dealings were effected by way of so-called baikal, i.e., a matching of the Association's
buy order with an investment trust's sell order through a single exchange member or a matching
of the buy order with the member's own offer at the price at which the last sale of the security
was executed on the exchange. Stock exchanges granted privileged commission rates, at one-
half of the ordinary rates, for sales by investment trusts, and provided commission-free trans-
actions between the Association and its partners. 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 66. As for baikal and the
subsequent ban thereof, see Tatsuta, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 92-93.
164 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 67; 1970 SB Ann. Rep. 34.
165 The Holding Association's profits were approximately 45 billion yen, from which 12.3
billion yen was contributed to a newly-formed foundation, Capital Market Promotion Founda-
tion (Shlihonshia Shinka Zaidan), whose purpose is to aid the sound development of the capital
market by giving assistance to activitities that promote the protection of investors and the
growth of the securities market. 1969 SB Ann. Rep. 12-13. The Foundation has awarded
financial support to scholars, including the writer, regardless of their prior views with respect to
the pools. Out of the approximately 34 billion yen surplus held by Joint Securities at the time
of its liquidation, 28 billion yen were contributed to another newly-formed foundation, Aihon
Kydb Shaken Zaidanz (Japan Joint Securities Foundation), which has for its purpose the
support of activities that promote the protection of the general public and related research by
public organizations in the securities, banking and insurance industries. 1971 SB Ann. Rep.
65-66.
166 1965 SB Ann. Rep. 62.
16 7 Id. at64.
168 Customers coming to the firm's offices, usually 3,000 to 4,000 a day, increased to
14,345 on May 22 and 20,338 on May 28. Anonym, Sh~kenkai no Shin'y~fitan to Kinkyfl-
kyasai no Hbteki Mechanism (Credit Disturbance in Securities Industry and Legal Mechanism
of Emergent Redress). No. 355 Shoji Homu 23, 24 (1965). These customers requested cancella-
tion of their investment trust contracts, investment deposit (un 'y-azukar') contracts and
safety deposit contracts. As to investment deposit and its final ban, see Tatsuta, op. cit. supra
n. 3, at 72 n. 19.
169 1967 SB Ann. Rep. 19. The Bank of Japan Law, Law No. 67 of 1942, art. 25, provides:
The Bank of Japan may, with the permission of the competent Minister, undertake such
businesses as are necessary for the maintenance and fostering of the credit system.
170 1967 SB Ann. Rep. 19; Anonym, op. cit. supra n. 168, at 23, 25; Arakawa, op. cit.
supra n. 156, at 159.
171 1967 SB Ann. Rep. 19-20. Oi Securities, predecessor of the present Wak5 Securities
Company, was also granted special loans amounting to 5.3 billion yen, and followed a similar
course. Id. at 21.
112 So did the new 01, Le., Wak. 1970 SB Ann. Rep. 32-34.
173 1967 SB Ann. Rep. 22. Investment deposits (un'yU.azukari, no. 168 supra), which
provided securities companies with a considerable amount of funds for their dealer business,
were banned in the end. 1970 SB Ann. Rep. 35-39.
174 Although not a few corporations became insolvent and failed during the recession of the
mid-1960s, the name San'y6 Steel has been referred to whenever one speaks of window-dress-
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ing, because of the size of the corporation, the large amounts involved in the falsified figures
(comparable to the McKesson and Robbins scandal: SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19
(1940)), and the great impact on many other corporations and individuals. A large number of
subcontractors went down like ninepins, and their employees were also affected seriously.
This case even triggered amendments to the Corporate Reorganization Law (Kaishak~seih0),
Law No. 172 of 1952, as anended by Law No. 88 of 1967, a counterpart of Chapter X of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Act. Matsuda, Kaishak6seihM (Corporate Reorganization Law ) 2 (rev. ed.
1976).
175 1966 SB Ann. Rep. 63; Nippon Keizai Shimbun, Shbkenbu (Japan Economic Journal,
Securities Dept.), Funshoku Kessan (Window-dressing Accounting) 14-15 (ed. 1966);
Kawamoto and Kanzaki, 'San'ykb' Kaishakbsei-fiken no Hateki Kent6 (Legal Study on
San'y6 Steel Corporate Reorganization Case), No. 355 Sh6ji H1mu 2-3 (1965).
176 Nippon Keizai Shimbun, Sh6kenbu, op. cit. supra n. 175, at 18.
177 SEL art. 200, item 1; art, 205, item 2-2. By virtue of the 1966 amendments, the crime
of making untrue statements in a periodic report came to be governed by article 197, item 1-2,
which has heavier penal sanctions.
178 The disciplinary action was publicized pursuant to the CPA Law art. 34, para. 3. 1946
SB Ann. Rep. 63. The CPA Law was also amended (Law No. 85 of 1966) to improve the CPA
system. Galvanized by the San'y6 Steel scandal, the Securities Bureau tightened its review of
financial statements filed with it and found several other cases of untrue statements. It
suspended the business of 16 CPAs for periods of from one to three months at the end of 1966.
1967 SB Ann. Rep. 46.
179 Harada (Reorganization trustee for San'y6 Tokushuseik6 K.K.) v. Ogino et aL,
17 Kakyfi Minshii (Lower Court Reporter) 222 (Kobe Dist. Ct., Himeji Branch, April 11,
1966).
180 1970 SB Ann. Rep. 64.
181 Id.
182 SEL art. 187.
183 1970 SB Ann. Rep. 64. The Bureau makes the poor excuse that it did not intend to
help accelerate the offering. Id.
184 SEL art. 10, para. 1.
185 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 44-46.
186 Id. at 46. Relevant provisions are: SEL art. 125, para. 2 (prohibition of manipulation),
para. 3 (restriction on stabilization), and art. 197, item 2 (penal sanction for violation of art.
125); Commercial Code art. 210 (restriction on repurchase by a corporation of its own shares)
and art. 489, item 2 (penal sanction for violation of art. 210).
187 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 46. The action was based on SEL art. 35, and the substantive provi-
sion claimed to be violated was the Soundness Rule, art. 1, item 3. See text supra at n. 101.
188 1973 SB Ann. Rep. 46.
189 1975 SB Ann. Rep. 50-51; Kanzaki, Nihon Netsugaku Jiken no Hateki Kenta (Legal
Study on Nihon Netsugaku Case), No. 676 Sh~ji H~mu 2-4 (1974).
190 Kanzaki, op. cit. supra n. 189, at 8. The stock was priced at 15 yen on August 21, just
prior to its delisting. Id. at 2.
191 Japan v. Okuma et aL, No. 780 Sh6ji H6mu 30 (Osaka Dist. Ct., June 28, 1977). They
were convicted of illegal distribution of dividends and bonuses (Commercial Code art. 489, item
3); special misappropriation (Commercial Code art. 486, para. 1); repurchase by the corpora-
tion of its own shares (Commercial Code art. 489, item 2); untrue entries in periodic reports
(SEL art. 197, item 1-2); and manipulation (SEL art. 125, para. 3; art. 197, item 2).
192 1975 SB Ann. Rep. 50.
193 1975 SB Ann. Rep. 51-52. The statutory provisions applied are the same as those
cited in n. 187 supra.
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194 1975 SB Ann. Rep. 52. Another penal procedure, involving window-dressing and
manipulation by Tokyo Tokei Seiz6 Co., Ltd., a manufacturer and distributor of'clocks, foods
and sporting goods, has been reported. 1976 SB Ann. Rep. 71-73; Japan v. Sat6 et al., No.
764 Sh6ji Hbmu 28 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 24, 1976).
Misao Tatsuta (b. 1933) received his B. Jur. (H6gakushi) degree in 1956 from Kyoto
University, Japan, and his LL.M. degree in 1966 from the University of California, Berkeley.
He was an assistant from 1956 through 1958, a lecturer for one year, an associate professor
from 1959 through 1970, and since then he has been aProfessor ofLav, allat Kyoto University.
He is especially interested in corporation law and securities regulation. Some of his publications
are available in English, such as Securities Regulation in Japan (1970), with addendum (1971);
and Patterns of Restricting Share Reacquisitions by Corporations, 6 Law in Japan: An Annual
128 (1973).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol1/iss2/1
